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Revenge is a universal phenomenon in human behavior. All 
human societies that have established moral or legal codes 
of conduct have based these codes, to varying degrees, upon 
systemized retribution. In times of war, societies and 
their institutions undergo a transformation in which 
pathological behavior can potentially undermine the moral 
restraints that regulate the instruments of legitimized 
revenge. When this happens, especially in the case of 
military retribution against civilians, the result is an 
abhorrent tragedy. 
Such a tragedy occurred in June, 1942, when elements of 
the German army destroyed the Czechoslovak town of Lidice in 
retaliation for the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich. The 
soldiers involved in the massacre were clearly not homicidal 
maniacs, yet they still were able to make the difficult 
moral decision to participate int he killing. By examining 
history, as well as psychological, sociological, and 
political theory, it is possible to develop a method for 
studying the means by which these soldiers were given 
adequate permission to engage in pathological activity. 
This permission comes from two sources. The first source 
is found in personal psychological reactions to the context 
of war. The nature of partisanship evokes pathological 
behavior trends in nonpathological individuals. In this 
study, the phenomenon is called "unconscious" permission. 
The second source of permission comes from the language of 
individual leaders. Through rhetoric, propoganda, and 
direct orders, leaders can provide their subordinates with 
"conscious" permission to engage in pathological behavior. 
Recent developments in diplomacy regarding military 
peacekeeping have placed more demands upon soldiers for 
rational, more mature decisions and behavior than ever 
before. Contemporary military leaders and statesmen must be 
aware of the effects of their language in the context of war 
if modern peacekeeping missions are to avoid the spectre of 
revenge. 
Director: Paul G. Lauren, PhD. 
ii 
CONTENTS 
A B S T R A C T  . . . . . . . .  
CHAPTER 
I .  I N T R O D U C T I O N  . . . . .  
II. THEORY AND METHOD: 
EMOTIONS AND PRAGMATICS 
III. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
THE CZECHS AND THE GERMANS. 
IV. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS: DOCUMENTS 
V. POLITICAL ANALYSIS: 
CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS PERMISSION 
VI. REVENGE NOW AND IN THE FUTURE 
B I B L I O G R A P H Y  . . . . . . .  
iii 
Chapter I 
Introduction 
On the evening of June 9, 1942, elements of the German 
army, accompanied by the Czech gendarmerie, surrounded the 
Czechoslovak mining town of Lidice. They established 
roadblocks to completely isolate the community. None of the 
villagers could leave, and no outsiders could enter the 
town. The soldiers allowed only those miners returning from 
work to pass through the roadblocks. That night, the 
soldiers forced the people of Lidice from their homes and 
began to execute an order issued earlier that day by the 
acting Reichsprotector of Bohemia and Moravia. 
The women and children were loaded onto trucks and 
taken to nearby Kladno. In the morning, the men were taken 
to the Horack farm. While the men waited in the farmyard, 
the Germans busied themselves dispersing the livestock and 
scouring the village, "requisitioning" valuables from the 
houses of Lidice. Later in the morning, a firing squad 
assembled in the farmyard and the execution of the men of 
Lidice began. The Czech men were marched into the farmyard 
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in groups of ten. The Germans made the men stand in front 
of mattresses placed against one of the walls of the yard. 
When one line of men was shot, another group was marched in 
and positioned in front of the last. The executions 
continued throughout the morning, with two pauses during 
which the executioners were served schnapps to relieve their 
fatigue, until the bodies of the men of Lidice completely 
covered the yard of the Horack farm. 
Meanwhile, in nearby Kladno, the women and children 
were being evaluated and processed by the Germans. Those 
children deemed racially acceptable were set aside to be 
sent to German foster families. The rest were loaded onto 
trains and sent first to the concentration camp at Lodz, and 
from there to the extermination camp at Chelmno. Those 
children not yet one year of age accompanied their mothers 
to the concentration camp at Ravensbruck. 
After the village had been emptied of its inhabitants, 
the Germans set to work demolishing it. Workers set off 
explosives in the buildings, dug up the cemetery, and set 
the village ablaze. Over the next few months, German 
workers hauled the rubble of Lidice away and planted fields 
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over the ruins, leaving only the faint traces of a few 
building foundations as testament to the fact that a town 
once stood on the spot. 
The destruction of Lidice was an act of revenge: A 
direct response to the assassination of Reinhardt Heydrich, 
the SS officer in command of German-occupied territories in 
Czechoslovakia. The German actions at Lidice satisfied the 
need for retribution among the German occupiers of 
Czechoslovakia. As a behavioral process of healing, the 
destruction of Lidice served a vital function in satisfying 
the natural, emotional desire of the Germans for retaliation 
against their enemies. 
To say that human beings are naturally driven to carry 
out acts of revenge for offenses committed against 
themselves or their affiliates is hardly a revelation. 
Revenge is a motive force in human behavior as natural and 
universal as any other aggressive survival tactic. It is 
likely that in any human language there exists a word or 
words that describe revenge, balancing accounts, an evening 
of scores. In Western romance languages, the etymological 
roots are found in the Latin: vincere, to conquer; vindex. 
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avenger; vindicta. vengeance. In German, die Rache or die 
Revanche. and Revanche in French, describe revenge. This 
linguistic phenomenon extends far beyond the cultures of 
Europe. In the native cultures of New Zealand, the Maori 
word, utu. denotes a continuing balance. Utu implies a 
process of retribution wherein the injured party may exact 
immediate retaliation or instigate a long, protracted 
partisan feud aimed at settling the score. The motivation 
for revenge goes far beyond the desire of an individual to 
"get even." Whether immediate or long term, action demands 
reaction to maintain the social balance. 
Most of the recorded attempts at regulating social 
behavior through legalistic codes are founded on a system of 
balancing offensive action with retributive reaction. 
Religious texts shed light on the fundamental values 
regarding the use of revenge as a balancing force in human 
affairs. The following passage from The Koran illustrates 
the legitimate place of revenge in Islamic society: 
We have therein commanded them that they 
should give life for life, and eye for eye, 
and nose for nose, and ear for ear, and tooth 
for tooth; and that wounds should also be 
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punished by retaliation.^ 
In a passage that is nearly identical to the Islamic "Law of 
Retribution," the Hebrew book of Exodus outlines the 
foundations for legitimate revenge: 
If any harm follows, then you shall give life 
for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand 
for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound 
for wound, stripe for stripe.^ 
The necessity for revenge in these passages seems 
evident. In order to regulate a population, rulers must 
establish certain strictures which provide for the 
possibility of retribution--the maintenance of a balance. 
As human societies grew in size and complexity, so did the 
legal codices expand to include more specific and complex 
systems to regulate conduct. At their core, though, human 
law codes have and continue to contain the fundamental 
philosophy of balance through retribution: Legitimized 
revenge. 
In an atmosphere of peace and stability, human 
societies are able to effectively utilize this retributive 
^ The Koran ch. V. 
' Exodus XXI. 
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philosophy to maintain social balance and harmony. The 
history of the human experience, as recorded through the 
ages, does not, however, portray a generally continuous 
atmosphere of peace and stability. As cultures expanded and 
came into contact with one another, the natural conflict 
generated by social groups competing for territory and 
resources more often than not led (and continues to lead) to 
violence. While revenge can effectively be used to maintain 
harmony and balance during peacetime, it is the tendency of 
humans at war to perpetuate revenge beyond the balancing of 
a social equation. In her philosophical work entitled, A 
Strategy for Peace. Sissela Bok describes this tendency in 
her analysis of what she calls the "Pathology of 
Partisanship." 
In time of war or other intense conflict, 
partisanship can foster a pathology all its 
own. When this happens, partisanship goes 
beyond the emphasis on loyalty and cohesion 
needed for the well-being of any community 
and leads people to become obsessive and 
heedless of their group's long-range self-
interest, and even of its survival.^ 
^ Sissela Bok, A Strategy for War and Peace: Human Values 
and the Threat of War (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), p. 6. 
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Though Bok does not address her analysis specifically to 
revenge, the transition from partisanship to revenge in her 
theory is not difficult to effect. The goals of warring 
partisans and people who carry-out acts of revenge are quite 
similar: Partisans fight to right perceived injustices done 
to them and their fellows; the Islamic "law of Retribution" 
provides the legal framework within which injustices can be 
righted. If partisans are vulnerable to a pathological 
escalation of their endeavors during warfare, then those 
people and institutions who attempt to exact revenge upon 
one another within the context of war are similarly 
susceptible. When this pathology comes to guide the hand of 
a society's military institution, tragic atrocities too 
often result. 
These acts of revenge carried out by a society's 
military apparatus mar the record of human history since 
antiquity. In 146 BC, Roman forces, largely in retaliation 
for the humiliation of their own forces during Hannibal's 
Italian campaign fifty years earlier, destroyed the city of 
Carthage. All of the inhabitants were either killed or 
enslaved. The city was razed to the ground and the fields 
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sown with salt. During the Thirty Years' War (1614-1618) 
the distinction between combatants and noncombatants all but 
vanished as the Christian denominations of Central Europe 
fought a pathologically escalative war of annihilation. In 
the French Revolution of the following century, the towns 
and inhabitants of Vendee and Lyon suffered the same sort of 
retribution as had the Carthaginians so many centuries 
earlier during the Punic Wars. At Lyon, townspeople were 
tied to stakes and fired upon by the cannon of the 
Revolutionary forces. Robespierre's Terror is the very 
embodiment of pathological revenge during warfare. 
The twentieth century has surpassed all other 
historical epochs in the horror wrought by vindictive 
behavior during war. Revenge for the assassination of 
Archduke Ferdinand of Austria in 1914 set in motion a chain 
of events that developed into a war which forever changed 
the culture of the Western world. Within three decades, 
place-names like Auschwitz, Chelmno, Ravensbruck, and Dachau 
would emerge in our vocabulary to conjure up dark images of 
Hitler's wartime revenge against the Jews: Retaliation for 
a fabricated Jewish movement which led to the German defeat 
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in World War I. The Allies decision to firebomb Dresden was 
driven exclusively by revenge. During the Vietnam War, 
United States soldiers, in an act of pathological revenge 
destroyed the village of Mi Lai and massacred the 
inhabitants. During the Gulf War, U.S. soldiers liberating 
Kuwait City were charged with war crimes, their vindictive 
behavior driven by rumors of the suffering of the Kuwatis at 
the hands of the Iraqi soldiers. 
Over the last few years, even the last few months, 
weeks and days, in international conflicts in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Serbia, Israel, Ireland, and the United 
Kingdom, and in civil wars in places like Sri Lanka, Rwanda, 
and Liberia, the world has been shocked again and again by 
tales of vindictive brutality and murder of civilians at the 
hands of military institutions. Wherever and whenever human 
societies lock themselves in mortal combat, the pathology of 
revenge produces a litany of names and places that become 
synonymous with terror and abject suffering. Few things 
produce more powerful emotions and reflection than news of 
military forces attacking defenseless civilian populations 
in acts of revenge. 
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when people witness a tragedy on the scale of a 
vengeful war crime, they are left searching for answers. As 
detailed above, most societies have at their legal base some 
form of systemized retribution. Both Judeo-Christian and 
Islamic societies have in their fundamental scriptures 
language that legitimizes, or permits revenge. These 
passages are intended to maintain equilibrium among the 
individuals of a society. The doctrine of life for life and 
eye for eye maintains this balance through proportional 
action and reaction: The severity of the punishment is 
determined by the severity of the crime. When pathological 
behavior comes to drive the natural impulse toward revenge, 
as seen in the case of Lidice, the proportionality of this 
retributive equation is upset, threatening stability within 
the parties involved. 
It is convenient and comfortable to shrug-off the issue 
of revenge in war, evoking the kind of "all's fair" logic 
that is so often used to explain-away the horrors of war. 
While it is evident from Bok's examination of pathology in 
the context of war that human values and behavior are 
significantly altered through the experience of war, to 
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simply declare that, "In war, anything makes sense," 
truncates the problem after the fact and lends apathetic 
thoughtlessness to the issue. Many scholars have attempted 
to confront complex social and political issues with the 
intent on positing a solution--a solution that effects a 
change in human nature/behavior through enlightenment. This 
study represents just such an attempt to illuminate the 
issue of pathological revenge during war and speculate about 
possible solutions. 
In order to ascertain the reasons why a Mi Lai or a 
Lidice occurred, one of the first appropriate steps would be 
an examination of the social values within the societies 
enacting the vengeful atrocities. This analysis will seek 
to identify such values by searching for permissive 
language--language that increases the possibility of an act 
of pathological revenge during times of war. 
While it is possible to argue that warring societies 
promote acts of brutal revenge on the part of their military 
institutions, such an argument, as mentioned above, does not 
lend itself to the search for potential remedies. Even if 
it were the goal of this work to illustrate socio-political 
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trends in human behavior that promote wartime atrocities, to 
claim that human nature, even during war, promotes the 
massacre of innocents in the name of revenge is problematic 
at the least. While humans might not necessarily promote 
such atrocities, values must exist in any society that 
permit nonpathological people to engage in pathological 
behavior. Part of this permission can be found in 
contemporary language. Through the speeches and writing of 
national leaders, it is possible to identify certain 
permissive values, that can rationalize pathological acts of 
revenge. 
In examining acts of wartime revenge as they have 
occurred in the past, two types become apparent. All 
revenge has the same source--an emotional response to a 
transgression committed against a person, an institution, or 
both. After the initial act which precipitates the revenge, 
at least two courses of action can go into effect. In one 
case, revenge is immediate and taken without forethought. 
Individuals or groups respond instantly and emotionally to a 
situation. The massacre of civilians by U.S. soldiers at Mi 
Lai and the conduct of the 1st Marine Division during the 
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Gulf War are classic examples of this type of event-driven 
revenge. The soldiers, affected by past events and the 
present situation, initiated revenge as individuals, and as 
a group acted in concert without having any pre-arranged 
plan to do so. 
Another type of revenge has the same emotional sources 
as the first, but takes a radically different course. 
Instead of being an immediate, irrational reaction to a 
situation, the actors set a deliberate plan into motion. 
Options are weighed, logical targets are selected, and the 
revenge is carried out deliberately and systematically, 
following a definite plan of action. 
This second, deliberate type of revenge is the focus of 
this study. The case of Lidice provides a perfect model of 
this well-planned, rational act of pathological retribution. 
As described above, Reinhardt Heydrich, the SS commander in 
the annexed territories of Bohemia and Moravia, was 
assassinated by Czech resistance fighters. The German 
response took the form of the execution or deportation of 
the entire population of Lidice and the complete destruction 
of the town. The remarkable issue surrounding the case of 
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Lidice is the lapse of time between action and reaction. 
Where the massacre at Mi Lai was a process of action and 
reaction occurring during a single day, the destruction of 
Lidice followed the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich by 
thirteen days. 
The primary goal of this work is to provide an analysis 
of permissive values that undergirded Nazi society--values 
that permitted and provided justification for such action. 
This thesis rests on the assumption that the Germans, to a 
certain extent, acted voluntarily in committing these acts. 
While it is true that they were acting under orders, each 
soldier in the firing squads, each worker who helped 
dismantle the village, and each soldier who sent the women 
and children off to concentration camps still, at some 
level, had to make an individual decision to participate in 
the destruction. In the absence of some degree of social 
permission, the only explanation left to analyze their 
motives is individual pathology. To argue that the forces 
arrayed at Lidice were entirely composed of homicidal 
maniacs would, of course, be foolish. 
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In order to discover these permissive values, this 
analysis will combine the disciplines of psychology, 
sociology, linguistics, and political theory with historical 
analysis. Chapter II outlines the general methodological 
approach. Using psychology as a base, it is possible to 
construct a behavioral model which enables an analysis of 
societal pathological behavior and its sources. Chapter III 
provides a contextual analysis of the increasingly 
pathological relationship between Germany and the 
Czechoslovak Republic between 1918 and 1942 . Chapter IV, in 
part, employs the method developed in Chapter II to examine 
the rhetoric of Adolf Hitler for permissive values as they 
can be applied to revenge. Chapter V concludes the analysis 
of permission with an examination of human behavior as 
manifested and examined in political theory. 
While this is a study of a single case in history, it 
is in no way intended to advance a description of Nazi 
society as being peculiarly permissive toward acts of 
revenge. To do so would promote the erroneous argument of a 
Deutscher Sonderweg and, more importantly, it would be an 
inappropriate and distasteful treatment of German culture. 
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By examining the actions of the Germans at Lidice and, more 
importantly, the language of Adolf Hitler, the purpose of 
this study is to illuminate institutionalized military 
revenge as a universal, species-wide phenomenon among 
humans. 
This study is intended as a speculative view of the 
future of statecraft and military operations as well as an 
informative analysis of past events. Too often the 
importance of human emotions and feelings are ignored in 
decisions of state. In this era when global peacekeeping 
efforts rely more and more on military issues and 
organizations for success, there is a distinct need to 
incorporate the study of human emotions into all levels of 
the peacekeeping process: From the sweeping policy 
negotiations down to front-line troop leadership. 
chapter II 
Theory and Method: Emotions and Pragmatics 
Feelings and emotions--including that of revenge--often 
serve as the fundamental forces which drive human behavior. 
Our daily conduct is a progression of decisions based upon 
our emotional reactions to various stimuli. When we are 
confronted with events that require some sort of reaction or 
decision, our subsequent conduct, logical or not, is a 
product of our values and thoughtfulness tempered by our 
emotions. During crisis times such as war or natural 
disasters, the quality of human emotions can change, leading 
in some instances to irrational, or even pathological 
decisions.^ As important as feelings and emotions are to 
human behavior, treatment of such phenomena is conspicuously 
absent both in scholarly analysis of historical events and 
the conduct of international affairs, such as treaties. 
Another area which lacks sufficient analysis of the role of 
human emotions in behavior is the field of military 
leadership. While leadership manuals detail various 
^ See Bok above. 
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emotional considerations military leaders must address in 
order to maintain the combat effectiveness of their troops, 
none directly outline the potential affectiveness of 
emotions of soldiers upon the manner in which they conduct 
combat operations. 
In addition to providing an analysis of revenge in war, 
this work is intended, in part, to highlight the need for 
more detailed treatment of the phenomena of feelings and 
emotions in the development and implementation of 
international peacekeeping policy. In order to effectively 
address these issues, it is necessary to examine works of 
psychological and sociological theory that illuminate the 
important role that emotions play in human behavior and the 
manner in which emotions, experienced collectively, can 
influence political and social decisions and conduct. By 
combining psychological theory with the historical analysis 
of international relations, we can draw more complete and 
compelling conclusions regarding the influence of feelings 
and emotions both at Lidice in 1942, and in the more general 
framework of international security and peacekeeping. 
One sociologist who has done extensive work in the role 
of emotions in human conduct is Thomas Scheff. His 1994 
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work entitled. Bloody Revenge: Emotions. Nationalism, and 
War. presents an examination of emotions that produce 
vindictive behavior in societies and the manifestations of 
these emotions in the outbreak of war. Scheff bases much of 
his work on psychological theories developed by Helen Lewis 
in her 1971 book, Shame and Guilt in Neurosis. Scheff 
focuses on Lewis's pioneering work in identifying shame as 
one of the primary motivating emotions in human behavior, 
and her further development of therapeutic approaches to 
problems in personal relationships and psyches caused by 
shame. 
By analyzing the transcripts of dozens of therapy 
sessions, Lewis is able to define the nature of shame in 
human emotions, and further describe a pattern of 
potentially aggressive and destructive behavior produced by 
shame. She describes a certain level of contact or 
"connectedness" among human beings. Shame can result when 
the intensity of that connectedness is significantly 
altered, and individuals feel alienated. If human contact 
becomes so intimate that one party feels enveloped, exposed, 
or violated, that party experiences some amount of shame. 
Likewise, if the contact becomes too remote, a feeling of 
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isolation can produce shame. This breech in human 
solidarity can be caused by another person's actions, or an 
encounter with other "ill-defined" sources.^ Lewis 
describes shame as an acutely painful experience that 
results not only in a certain degree of mental anguish, but 
physical changes as well. This physical response to shame 
involves agitation resulting from the arousal of internal 
organs and kinesthetic feedback.® 
Lewis's description of the physiological human 
responses to shame closely resembles the phenomenon commonly 
described as a "fight or flight" reaction. Any threat (such 
as pain) to the self elicits an agitated response in which 
the object of the threat is moved to either retreat from, or 
aggressively confront the threat. The natural desire to 
eliminate threats through aggression or flight is a 
primitive behavioral defense mechanism. Lewis addresses the 
need for humans to likewise defend themselves from the pain 
induced by shame. When individuals encounter shameful 
® Helen B. Lewis, Shame and Guilt in Neurosis (New York: 
International Universities Press, Inc., 1971), p. 39. We 
can assume Lewis means that shameful emotions are not 
exclusively the product of other individuals' actions. 
' Ibid. 
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situations, as such situations imply some measure of 
hostility directed against that individual,' natural 
reactions are to either distance themselves from the source 
of shame (through hiding, a form of 'flight') or, more 
commonly, repress the feelings of shame in an attempt to 
ignore them.® 
Lewis claims that this phenomenon of "bypassed" shame 
leads to neurotic behavior. The emotion of shame itself can 
ultimately redirect the hostile emotions resulting from 
shame. When a person experiences shame from another source, 
it is shame and guilt, in the form of rationality, that 
diffuses hostility and leads to a nonaggressive resolution 
of the confrontation.® If, in other words, a person is 
shamed and acknowledges the validity of the situation, much 
as in the case of an embarrassing public critique from a 
colleague, that person realizes the further shame and 
subsequent guilt that can arise from retaliation. They will 
feel bad for behaving vindictively. 
' Ibid, p. 41. 
® Ibid, p. 38. 
® Ibid. 
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If, however, in defense, individuals attempt to deny or 
repress their shameful emotions, it is impossible for them 
to acknowledge their shame, thereby denying a vent for the 
natural physical and mental agitation evoked by shame. By 
internalizing shameful emotions, individuals become more 
prone to "discharge" their anxiety in the form of hostility 
directed against others.^" It is this "bypassed" shame, 
Lewis argues, which produces vengeful emotions that, in 
turn, drive aggressively hostile behavior in an attempt to 
exact revenge and humiliate the source of the shame. 
For shame to occur there must be an 
emotional relationship between the person 
[experiencing shameful emotions] and the 
"other" [source of shame].... In this 
affective tie the self does not feel 
autonomous or independent, but dependent and 
vulnerable to rejection. Shame is a 
vicarious experience of the significant 
other's scorn. A "righting" tendency often 
evoked by shame is the "turning of the 
tables." Evoked hostility presses toward 
triumph over or humiliation of the "other," 
i.e., to the vicarious experience of the 
other's shame." 
" Ibid, pp. 40-41, 44-45, 179, 248-9. 
Ibid, p. 46. 
Ibid, p. 42. 
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Lewis's connection between the experience of shame and 
the onset of vengeful emotions is clear. This affective 
relationship between shame and revenge is not a mysterious 
puzzle accessible only to scholars of psychoanalytic theory. 
We have all experienced the emotional process described by 
Lewis. When we are shamed, embarrassed, or harmed by 
another person, part of our natural response contains the 
desire at least to seek revenge, if not actual vindictive 
behavior. 
Expanding on Lewis's theoretical work linking 
unacknowledged shame and emotional hostility, Scheff and 
Suzanne Retzinger make a close tie between shame and 
violent, destructive aggression in their 1991 book. Emotions 
and Violence: Shame and Rage in Destructive Conflicts. 
Using several different types of case studies, Scheff and 
Retzinger make a clear case for the commonality of the 
shame-hostility cycle in humans and further project this 
behavior onto a larger, society-wide canvas. 
Part of their study focuses on human solidarity and 
alienation. In an analysis of several different sets of 
game show contestants, the reactions to winning and losing 
among the two-person teams were nearly identical. When 
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victorious, the contestants would display classic behavioral 
cues indicating pride and solidarity: Eye contact, wide-open 
eyes, smiling, closeness and actual physical contact. In 
defeat, these same pairs showed signs of shame and 
alienation: No eye contact, closed or hidden eyes (an 
attempt to hide), physical distancing from one another, 
frowns or grimaces. In a similar study of "victims" of 
Allan Funt's comedy show. Candid Camera, the reactions of 
the subjects of practical jokes all displayed strikingly 
similar shame cues. They either hid or closed their eyes, 
or "shrank" inward in an unconscious attempt to reduce their 
size (one man even crawled under a desk); most importantly, 
all the subjects displayed excited, agitated behavior. 
Combining an analysis of unacknowledged shame and 
violent emotions (based on Lewis's theory) with their 
analysis of the universal nature of human behavior resulting 
from shame and alienation, Scheff and Retzinger develop a 
theory of social conflict. Their theory outlines a process 
Thomas J. Scheff and Suzanne M. Retzinger, Emotions and 
Violence: Shame and Rage in Destructive Conflicts 
(Lexington: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 54-60. 
" Ibid, pp. 43-53. 
that begins with a stimulus (verbal, linguistic, or 
paralinguistic) that evokes shame in a subject(s). If the 
subject is responsive to the shameful stimulus and 
acknowledges it, the bond between the subject and the 
"other" actually grows stronger, resulting in pride and 
solidarity. If, on the other hand, the subject is not 
responsive to the stimulus, alienation develops between the 
two parties which quickly develops into a pattern of 
pathological revenge. As a result of their unacknowledged 
shame, the subject becomes angry and responds 
disrespectfully to the "other" who, in turn, experiences 
shame, grows angry, and perpetuates the cycle of revenge. 
Scheff and Retzinger add to Lewis's theory of shame and 
hostile emotion to illuminate the tie between shame and 
violent, aggressive behavior: 
Lewis (1971) referred to the internal shame-
rage process...as "anger bound by shame" or 
"humiliated fury."... Shame-rage spirals may 
be brief, lasting a matter of minutes, or 
they can last for hours, days, or a lifetime, 
as bitter hatred or resentment.... Since such 
conflicts have no limits [due to the 
escalatory nature of pathological 
retribution], they may be lethal." 
Ibid, pp. 66-69. 
Ibid, p. 127. 
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In Bloody Revenge. Scheff uses the ideas that he and 
Retzinger developed in Emotions and Violence to describe 
warfare among nations as a product of shameful emotions as 
experienced by a society, and the naturally hostile 
discharge of those emotions. In order to link this 
emotional pattern to social behavior, Scheff proposes, 
...that when leaders of nations and their 
followers face large-scale, emotionally 
charged conflicts, they utilize the only 
dispute tactics they know--the ones they 
learned beneath the level of awareness, in 
their families.^' 
Scheff is trying to identify the emotional causes of war as 
they are evident in human behavior. These emotions are 
products of behavior that individuals learn from the society 
within which they live and interact daily. The emotions 
that lead humans to seek revenge through violence, in this 
setting, are thus not pathological aberrations, but rather 
inherent facets of human behavior. The consequences of such 
emotions in the context of war, however, are often tragic. 
As it applies to his study, Scheff maintains an inherent 
connection between war (as revenge) and human emotions: 
" Scheff, p. 34. 
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"...war is not just out there. separate from us; it is also 
in here, inside of us."^® 
Focusing on the emotions of shame and pride, Scheff 
examines the following excerpt from Mein Kampf using Lewis's 
analytical style of "discourse analysis" to make his case 
for WWII as an emotional act of collective revenge. Those 
words conveying shameful emotions are here italicized and 
those which indicate pride are underlined: 
Particularly our German people which today 
lies broken and defenseless, exposed to the 
kicks of all the world, needs that suggestive 
force that lies in self-confidence. This 
self-confidence must be inculcated in the 
young national comrade from childhood on. His 
whole education and training must be so 
ordered as to give him the conviction that he 
is absolutely superior to others. Through 
his physical strength and dexterity. he must 
recover his faith in invincibility of his 
whole people. For what formerly led the 
German army to victorv was the sum of the 
confidence which each individual had in 
himself and all together in their leadership. 
What will raise the German people up again is 
confidence. 
While Hitler is not directly calling for the German 
" Ibid, p. 12. 
Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf trans, by Ralph Manheim, 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1943) p. 411. Also cited in 
Scheff, p. 114. [My italics and underlines] 
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nation to rise in arms against its enemies, it is clear that 
he is implying that "strength and dexterity" will provide 
the confidence which, in turn, will lead to victory and a 
restoration of Germany's former greatness. It is not an 
unrealistic assumption to connect Hitler's language to his 
desire for revenge and satisfaction. In one aspect, 
according to Scheff, World War II was an act of vengeance 
directed against Germany's enemies from World War 1 
As mentioned above, Lewis examines the role of shame in 
producing neurotic behavior in individuals. Scheff relies 
heavily on Lewis's idea of "feeling traps" as well as the 
conflict theory outlined in Emotions and Violence to 
illuminate social emotions which can produce destructive 
behavior. Lewis describes a feeling trap as a process that 
begins with an insult. This insult immediately produces a 
feeling of alienation between the two parties. This 
alienation leads to shame which, should this shame remain 
unacknowledged (as described by Lewis), in turn produces 
rage and anger. This anger then leads to aggressive 
behavior, and even further to violence as outlined by Scheff 
Scheff, pp. 105-123. 
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and Retzinger.^^ In Bloody Revenge. Scheff projects this 
process of feeling traps upon nation-states to describe 
emotional motives for aggressive behavior (war) as a 
vengeful response to a collective feeling of alienation and 
shame. 
While Scheff's case for shame as the prime motivator 
for destructive behavior is well-established, his link 
between the emotions of individuals and social behavior is 
less clear. Up to this point, the theories examined have 
all been based primarily on psychological analyses of 
individuals. As a sociologist, Scheff identifies patterns 
in human behavior that indicate communal action resulting 
from individual values. He takes individual emotions and 
their effects, and projects them onto a social construct to 
explain social behavior. Scheff justifies this connection 
with a seemingly simple, yet very telling illustration of 
the historical evolution of shame in society. 
In order to establish this connection, Scheff turns to 
a 1978 analysis of the evolution of manners by Norbert 
Elias. Elias details the parallel relationship between 
Ibid, p. 69. 
30 
modernization and the "civilizing process...[of] 
the... moulding of the drive economy that we call 'shame' and 
'repugnance' or embarrassment.'" Scheff emphasized Elias's 
analysis of the increasing social concern regarding and 
conventions governing "proper" behavior such as table 
manners, bodily functions, sexuality and anger. Elias is 
concerned mainly with the connection between the development 
of rational thought and modernization. Even so, his 
discussion of the connection between individual shame and 
social table manners is a good illustration of the link that 
Scheff draws between individual emotions and social 
behavior. 
In the same vein, Scheff uses an analysis of politeness 
to describe the universal nature of social behavior as 
driven by individual emotions. In 1987, Brown and Levinson 
examined the common trends in human politeness behavior. 
In their analysis. Brown and Levinson discuss universal 
trends in language produced by the desire for correct 
Scheff, p. 46. He cites Norbert Elias, The History of 
Manners (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978). 
" P. Brown and S. Levinson, Politeness Behavior: Some 
Universals in Language Usage (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987) . 
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etiquette. As Scheff describes their analysis: "All known 
cultures provide elaborate means for protecting face, that 
is, protecting against embarrassment and humiliation."^^ In 
light of Elias's analysis, if politeness is a social 
behavioral trend aimed at reducing the occurrence of shame 
in individuals, then Brown and Levinson expand this idea to 
include all societies. Here, then, (in combination with the 
theories developed by Lewis, Retzinger, and Scheff) is an 
illustration of the two basic ideas pursued in this 
analysis: First, human social values (deriving from a 
composite of human emotions) are directly connected to an 
individual's decision/ability to participate in 
institutional acts of revenge and second, these values are 
not peculiar to a certain society (Germany), but are a 
universally human phenomenon. 
Developing a theory is only half the task of this 
project. In order for the theory to have any meaning, it is 
necessary to develop a method for analysis. Scheff provides 
the theoretical model upon which this analysis rests. His 
method, however, is another matter. Scheff bases his method 
Scheff, p. 51. 
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of language analysis in large part on the Gottschalk-Gleser 
Content Analysis Scales.As the title suggests, this work 
belongs to the larger field of behavioral study of content 
analysis. Content analysis, according to Gottschalk's 
method, is an attempt to quantify and analyze lingual and 
written communication as an "essential aspect of all social 
interaction, ranging from the interpersonal to the 
international levels."^® Content analysis involves 
assigning numerical values to certain words or 
constructions,^^ and then numerically quantifying this code 
to identify and predict behavioral patterns. Evidence that 
the methods of content analysis embraced by psychologists 
and sociologists have influenced a number of historians and 
political scientists can be found in the work of Robert 
- ^^--Lewis-A. Gottsch^rlkT Carolyn N. Winget, and Goldine C. 
Gleser, Manual of Instructions for the Gottschalk-Gleser 
Content Analysis Scales: Anxiety. Hostility, and Social 
Alienation-Personal Disorganization (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1969). 
Ibid, p. 1. 
Depending on the type of behavior that the analyst is 
attempting to illuminate--anger, shame, hostility, 
alienation, et c.--words and constructions will have 
different values as the objectives of the analysis change. 
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North and his associates.^® In their handbook, the authors 
describe a method for quantifying the text of documents in 
order to identify aspects of human behavior that can affect 
decision makers and further affect the formulation and 
implementation of international policy, especially as it 
regards "international crises and the behavior of states in 
conflict . 
As a method for quantifying text, content analysis is a 
valuable analytical tool. It is a means by which 
behavioralists can judge human conduct and make well-
informed predictions based on mathematical probability. It 
is, however, not without limitations. North claims that his 
work is a solution to the enigmatic practice of analyzing 
the complex world of international relations through 
qualitative methods. In his introduction. North implies 
that qualitative analysis demands a somewhat undisciplined 
leap of faith, a plunge "into the dark."^° 
Robert C. North, Ole R. Holsti, M. George Zaninovich, and 
Dina A. Zinnes, Content Analysis: A Handbook with 
Applications for the Study of International Crisis 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963) . 
Ibid, p. 3. [emphasis added] 
Ibid, p. xiii. 
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While this statement is valuable in light of the 
strengths as noted above, it is not analytical gospel. By 
reducing the language relative to international decision 
making to a numerical code, content analysis places very 
definite constraints upon one of the most complex and 
bedeviling issues facing modern scholars--human nature. 
Though it is a helpful and complicated tool that can be used 
to reduce the study of human behavior to numerically-
generated conclusions, content analysis also limits the 
latitude necessary for analysts to draw more general 
conclusions about universal human behavior. By relying on 
content analysis, scholars roam dangerously close to the 
borders of monocausal explanation. As seen in Scheff's 
work, shame alone is heralded as the primary motivation for 
the First and Second World Wars. Any responsible historian 
must answer such an assertion with the critique: "It is not 
that simple." 
As it pertains to this work on revenge and social 
pathology, content analysis is important in that it lends 
authority to the role that language plays in the formation 
of human values and the conduct of individuals. While 
content analysis is not the primary method employed here, it 
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is important to acknowledge the efforts of those who have, 
diligently, emphasized the importance of language through 
quantitative examination. Specific to the goals of this 
analysis, content analysis lays the scientific foundation 
for analyzing Hitler's rhetoric and extracting parts of his 
discourse which indicate shame and/or revenge. 
Human emotions and behavior present analysts with such 
a diverse and vexing array of variables and possibilities 
that content analysis, for all its complexity and 
thoroughness, is simply too limiting a method for a broad, 
general examination. Content analysis, however, belongs in 
part to the larger discipline of linguistic analysis called 
pragmatics. Pragmatics, in turn, is a subfield of 
semeiotics, or semantics. Semeiotics refers to that field 
of study dedicated to examining the meaning(s) of words as 
those meanings change over time and in certain contexts. 
Within the field of semeiotics, pragmatics focuses on the 
phenomena of cause and effect as affected by verbal 
communication. T. Givon describes pragmatics as, 
an approach to description, to information 
processing, thus to the construction, 
interpretation and communication of 
experience. At its core lies the notion of 
context, and the axiom that reality and/or 
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experience are not absolute fixed entities, 
but rather frame-dependent, contingent upon 
the observer's perspective.^^ 
Pragmatics refers to any study of language that focuses on 
the medium of communication, the sender, the interpreter(s), 
and the context within which the language is delivered and 
received. Concisely defined by Charles W. Morris, 
.'pragmatics' is designated the science of the relation 
of signs [lingual or textual communication] to their 
interpreters."^^ Pragmatics as a discipline contains many 
diverse subfields that range from complex coding systems 
such as content analysis to less restrictive, loosely-
defined analyses of the interpretation of metaphor. 
Whatever formats or methods, the objectives of all 
pragmatic analyses are similar. Analysts who engage in 
pragmatic examination seek to identify and extract 
T. Givon, Mind. Code, and Context: Essavs in Pragmatics 
(Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1989) p. xvii. 
Quoted in, Steven Davis, ed.. Pragmatics: A Reader 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) p. 3. 
" See George Lakoff's discussions of pragmatics in 
Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1980), and. Women. Fire and Dangerous Things: What 
Categories Reveal about the Mind (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1987). 
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connotative meaning from their target communication. One 
must be able to differentiate between denotative, or the 
direct meaning of communication and the connotative, or 
implied meaning of the same communication. All human 
communication has the potential to be used to affect both a 
direct and indirect understanding of the signs used in 
communication. I will use a hypothetical example to 
illustrate this point. If one person in a room was to say 
to another, "It is hot in here, don't you think so?", the 
direct meaning of the statement is clear--it is hot in the 
room. If we examine the context within which the statement 
is made, however, much more meaning may be gleaned from the 
statement. If the person who spoke is a guest at the second 
person's house, the statement can have an implied meaning by 
which the first person is trying to get the other to open a 
window and cool the room. If the second person represents 
an authoritative figure to the first, the reasons for using 
implied communication become more obvious. The first person 
(subordinate) is trying to affect approving action in the 
second (dominant) without seeming pretentious, rude, or 
insubordinate. 
38 
Connotative meaning does not have to be a direct and 
conscious effort as outlined above. The indirect effects of 
language on interpreters are affected by context and 
perception. A politician's speech might have a vast array 
of indirect meanings as the speech is perceived and 
interpreted by people of differing political views, economic 
situations, and religious preferences among others. 
Intentional or unintentional, the relationship between 
language and its interpreters is not limited to the 
perception of denotative meaning. Communication of meaning 
can potentially exist at several levels simultaneously when 
language is used. 
When examined alongside the writing of such theorists 
of international perception and misperception as Robert 
Jervis", we can see the usefulness of pragmatics in the 
study of relations between states. While Jervis is mainly 
concerned with the ways in which the perception of 
individual statesmen affects their attempt to define the 
nature of the international system, his work provides a link 
Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in 
International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1976) . 
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between the use of pragmatics to discover the hidden 
meanings in interpersonal communication and its application 
to a larger study of the rhetoric of national leaders and 
the values conveyed to/instilled upon the population as they 
perceive and interpret the signs used in communication. 
Pragmatics, then, provides the general methodological 
construct within which to analyze Hitler's rhetoric and its 
language of revenge. As apparent in the discussion above, 
this analysis uses pragmatics and many other disciplines to 
approach the issue of revenge. While such an approach runs 
the danger of seeming too diverse and undisciplined to 
provide ought but a superficial analysis of the material, it 
also can be strengthened by the application of many 
different points-of-view. Indeed, this work does not belong 
to any one single academic discipline. It is not purely 
history, nor political theory, nor sociology, psychology or 
linguistics. Rather, it borrows from each of these 
disciplines to produce an interdisciplinary analysis of one 
isolated aspect of the human condition. As a result, this 
work might seem to lack the depth and detail of a strictly 
historical monograph. In its defense, however, where it 
lacks depth and detail, it provides breadth and diversity. 
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Scholars cannot completely describe the complexities of 
human conditions through singular, exclusive disciplines. 
Whatever the other, specific definitions of disciplines 
within the fields of art and science may be, they all aim to 
illuminate some aspect of the human condition. As content 
analysis is too limiting a method to analyze the nebulous 
relationship between communication and interpreter, so too 
are history, political science, sociology and the rest too 
limited to address the complexity of the human experience 
when used alone. In conjunction, however, these disciplines 
can combine to provide a new, multifaceted view of the human 
condition. 
All academic efforts have their peculiar strengths and 
weaknesses whether they are used independently from one 
another or together. Paul Lauren analyzes this potential 
for marrying history and theory to develop well-informed 
policy. In his article, Lauren plays out the differences in 
approach between diplomatic historians and theorists and the 
manner in which two disciplines can combine to produce new 
thoughts in diplomatic scholarship. He asserts that through 
bleeding the borders of the realms of history and theory, 
students of diplomacy can attain a higher level of 
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scholarship that will result in "...better history, better 
theory, and perhaps, in turn and through use, even better 
policy. Gordon Craig further describes the broadening of 
the field of international relations in his article, "On the 
Nature of Diplomatic History.As is apparent in this 
chapter, the theory and method that provide the foundations 
for this study take many different disciplines into account 
Paul G. Lauren, "Diplomacy: History, Theory, and 
Policy," from Diplomacy: New Approaches in History. Theory. 
and Policy. Paul Lauren, ed., (New York: The Free Press, 
1979), pp. 3-18. 
Gordon Craig, "On the Nature of Diplomatic History: 
The Relevance of Some Old Books," from Diplomacy: New 
Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy. Paul Lauren, ed., 
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in the hope that it will shed a many-colored light on a 
complex issue. 
(New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 21-42. 
Chapter III 
Historical Analysis: The Czechs and the Germans 
The act of revenge for Heydrich's death carried out by the 
Germans at Lidice was not an isolated incident, rather, it 
was part of a continuing string of vindictive reactions. 
During the state of emergency which began on May 27, 1942, 
the day of Heydrich's assassination, and ended September, 
1942, the Germans would arrest and execute over one thousand 
Czechs and murder or deport the populations of two villages 
in revenge for the loss of their leader.^ From 1918 to 1942 
animosity between Czechoslovakia and Germany increased in 
intensity from the mild tension common among neighboring 
states, especially in the wake of a war, to pathological 
partisanship. The tragedy of Lidice constituted one small 
facet of a larger process of reciprocity that began with the 
Treaty of Versailles and continued to the end of World War 
II. While it was a minor factor in the vengeful process of 
^ On July 24, 1942, the tiny Czech village of Lezaky was 
burned down. All the inhabitants, men and women (33 persons 
total) were shot because they had offered shelter to Czech 
resistance agents. Radomir Luza, The Transfer of the 
Sudeten Germans (New York: New York University Press, 1964), 
p. 210. 
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Czech-German relations before and during the German 
occupation of Czechoslovakia, the destruction of Lidice 
further represents a singular event within the total process 
of revenge meted out by the Nazis in direct retaliation for 
Heydrich's death. 
Historians examining the revenge of the Germans at 
Lidice must view this event from the larger framework of not 
only World War II, but also the history of Czech-German 
relations from the creation of Czechoslovakia in 1918 to 
that fateful Spring of 1942. Here, one can clearly see a 
larger pattern of action and vengeful reaction dating from 
the close of World War I, and thus set the stage for what 
would occur. 
Since the end of World War I, historians have described 
the peace imposed by the Allies as a vindictive, punitive 
peace designed to punish the Central Powers for initiating a 
war which caused unparalleled destruction throughout Europe. 
In a style similar to the 1918 peace forced by Germany upon 
Russia at Brest-Litovsk, Germany was forced to pay for the 
damage wrought by the war in a variety of ways. The 
John Wheeler-Dennett, Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace. 
March. 1918 (London: Macmillan & Co., 1956), p. 405. 
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Allies required Germany to pay M20,000,000,000 to the Allies 
in 1919-1920. Equivalent annual payments were further 
mandated until all international claims against Germany were 
dropped." Negotiators at the Paris Peace conference 
further declared that the nations of Europe had the right to 
demand from Germany payment in kind of any material lost, 
broken, or destroyed as a result of the war. France alone 
demanded 30,000,000 tons of coal delivered per annum 
throughout the period of European reparation. 
Furthermore, Allied negotiators demanded that Germany turn 
over to the Allies the whole of her shipping fleet weighing 
over 1,600 tons gross; half of her vessels between 1,600 and 
1,000 tons; and one-quarter of her steam trawlers and other 
fishing craft.In total, German war reparations were set 
by the Allies at 25 per cent, of Germany's gross national 
" Philip Burnett, The Paris Peace Conference History and 
Documents: Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference from the 
Standpoint of the American Delegation Second Subcommittee of 
the Commission on Reparation of Damage: Minutes of the 
Thirty-Second (and Final) Meeting, April 19, 1919, Annex I 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1940) p. 751. 
Ibid, p. 746. 
" Ibid, p. 751. 
Ibid, Annex II, p. 754. 
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product to be paid between 1920 and 1921 alone. 
The retribution exacted by the Allies in the treaty of 
Versailles, while totally debilitating in economic terms, 
was not limited to financial responsibility. In addition to 
requiring reparation payments, the Allies ordered Germany to 
demobilize her military, placed strict limits upon her 
maritime production and activity, and ordered the country to 
accept temporary military occupation of the Saar by the 
French. In addition, the treaty forced Germany to give up 
territory in the west to France, in the East to Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, and overseas to a variety of victors. 
Beyond all these physically retributive measures, however, 
the negotiators at Versailles exacted a measure of 
psychological revenge as well. Germany was forced, by the 
terms of the Treaty, to accept full moral responsibility for 
World War I.^^ Through reparations, occupation, territorial 
concessions and humiliation, the Treaty of Versailles 
represented an act of revenge by the Allies in response to a 
perceived relationship between German aggression and the 
onset of the most destructive war ever fought up to that 
" Ibid, p. 744. 
" Ibid, pp. 66-77. 
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time . 
One of the most significant consequences of the Treaty 
of Versailles was the creation of new nation states 
throughout Central and Eastern Europe as well as in the 
Middle East. In the wake of the dissolved Hapsburg and 
Hohenzollern Empires, the Allies created the new nations of 
Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia. This final act of 
creating sympathetic allied states on the borders furthered 
obvious geopolitical tension between Germany and the Allies. 
It also created ethnic tension which would eventually 
provide Hitler with convenient excuses and emotional 
rhetoric enough to justify the annexation of Czechoslovakia 
in 1939. 
In his analysis of revenge, Scheff examines the 
language of Adolf Hitler to display the emotions necessary 
to explain World War II as an act of revenge on the part of 
the Germans. They acted in retribution for the humiliation 
and economic ruin of Germany resultant from the punitive 
peace at Versailles. Anyone who has read Mein Kampf could 
arrive at a similar conclusion. Hitler was obsessed with 
regaining lost German honor and was convinced that the means 
to secure that honor was the military defeat of its former 
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enemies. 
Czechoslovakia, in particular, posed a serious problem 
for Hitler in his plans to establish a new world order. 
Czechoslovakia symbolized the three aspects of European 
society most hated by Hitler. As a creation of the Treaty 
of Versailles, the very existence of an independent Czech 
state served as a constant reminder of the Diktat. or 
dictated peace, and emphasized the postwar humiliation of 
the German people. Czechoslovakia also occupied lands 
traditionally dominated by German-speaking Austrians before 
World War I. Finally, Czechoslovakia boasted a liberal 
western democracy, a style of government Hitler simply 
detested. 
Central to the Czech problem was the issue of the 
Sudeten Germans. When the Allies created Czechoslovakia, 
they included within its borders territory on the frontiers 
of Germany populated primarily by ethnic Germans. With the 
political collapse of the Hapsburg Empire and the economic 
ruination of Germany, the industrial and economic dominance 
of Germany and Austria-Hungary came to an end. The primary 
benefactor from this dissolution in Central Europe was the 
new Czechoslovak Republic. The nation, which before the 
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collapse of Austria-Hungary had represented only 2 6.4 per 
cent of the population of the Empire, now inherited over 70 
per cent of its industrial infrastructure.^® The Czechs 
moved to continue to modernize the their industrial base. 
While the early days of the new Republic were marked by a 
definite German dominance of capital, the efforts of the 
Czechs between 1918 and 1929, combined with the economic 
disintegration of the Weimar Republic ended an era of German 
economic hegemony throughout central Europe.^® 
This new economic situation shifted the financial 
dependence of Sudeten German industrialists from Germany to 
Czechoslovakia. By the time of the German economic collapse 
of 1931, German banks in Czechoslovakia could no longer 
serve the needs of Sudeten industrialists who, as a result, 
became almost completely reliant on the strong Czech economy 
for sustenance. The bond formed between the Czechs and 
the Sudeten Germans between 1918 and 1939 was, in economic 
Radomir Luza, The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans: A 
Study of Czech-German Relations. 1933-1962 (New York: New 
York University Press, 1964), p. 7. 
Ibid, p. 9. Luza estimates the proportion of Czech and 
German banking capital at 7 5 per cent and 2 5 per cent 
respectively in 1929. 
Ibid, p. 10. 
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terms, quite strong/® Any attempt by Hitler to turn the 
Sudeten Germans against the Czech government would be 
difficult due to the interdependence of the ethnic groups in 
the Sudetenland and the subsequent prosperity resulting from 
those ties. 
In spite of the strong economic ties between Czechs and 
Germans, other problems arose within the newly created state 
that served to drive a wedge between the Sudeten Germans and 
the Czechs in the years between 1919 and 1939. The 
resulting ethnic division of the population ultimately 
pushed ethnic tensions to a crisis point, enabled the rise 
of the Nazi Party in Czechoslovakia, and paved the road for 
Hitler's conquest of the nation in 1939. 
One such problem began in 1919 with the passage of the 
Land Reform Law. In an attempt to break the feudal mold and 
modernize land ownership in the new State, Czech authorities 
"The [Sudeten] German industrialists feared that an 
incorporation into Germany might result in a decline and 
extinction of their industries, which were unable to compete 
with the much more advanced industries of Germany. 
Instinctively, the [Sudeten] German population disliked the 
idea of being cut off from their Czech hinterland and 
[incorporated in the German economy]. J.W. Breugel, "The 
Germans in Pre-War Czechoslovakia." in A History of the 
Czechoslovak Republic. 1918-1948 Victor Mamety and Radomir 
Luza, eds., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973). 
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created the Land Office within the Czechoslovak Ministry of 
Agriculture/® This office provided oversight of land 
redistribution throughout Czechoslovakia. From the onset of 
land reform in 1919, accusations arose from the Sudeten 
population of unfair and discriminatory treatment. Germans 
in the Sudeten borderlands alleged that nearly 400,000 ha 
(hectares) of land had been taken from German aristocrats 
and given to Czechs.^" Although the Czech government 
attempted to placate the Germans by stressing that nearly 
200,000 more ha had been taken from Czechs than from 
Germans,®^ this redistribution was nonetheless perceived as 
unfair by the Germans. Furthermore, land reform in the 
Sudetenland also changed the ethnic make-up of a region 
traditionally dominated by ethnic Germans.®^ 
Luza, p. 10. 
Ibid, pp. 10-11. 
It is important to note that this figure comes from 
redistribution across the whole of Czechoslovakia, not just 
the Sudetenlands. 
While Czechoslovakia had been ruled before World War I by 
the Austrian Hapsburg dynasty, and not by Germany, the 
German-speaking population of the Sudetenlands fell, in the 
rhetoric of Hitler and the Nazis, under the general rubric 
of Germandom--the ethnic German Nation whose destiny it was 
to rule Central Europe. 
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Divisive issues generated by the reapportionment of 
land by the new Czech government continued to develop 
throughout the 1920's into a fierce struggle for land 
between Czechs and Germans throughout the Sudetenland. 
Radomir Luza, a former Czech resistance fighter, now 
teaching in the U.S. describes the atmosphere of 
intensifying conflict: 
[The Germans and Czechs] fought over even the 
smallest parcel of land, over every building 
lot and home property. The Germans were 
mostly on the defensive, with German landed 
property often passing without government 
interference into Czech ownership. ...For 
many of [the Germans] their relationship with 
the Czechs had been [before 1918] that of 
master and servant, and they could not yet 
believe that their former "servants" had 
reached full political, economic, social, and 
cultural maturity. 
The potential for a crisis evolving from the land 
reform movement of 1919 is clear, with the most obvious 
issue being the perceived injustice of the process as seen 
by the Germans. The per capita confiscation and 
readjustment of German property in the Sudetenland seems 
unproportionately larger than the amount of land being 
Ibid, pp . 12 -13 . 
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redistributed from the Czech aristocracy.^^ In addition to 
the imbalance, perceived at least, in land redistribution, 
the inversion of the traditional social relationship between 
Czechs and Sudeten Germans raised new emotional problems. 
In their eyes, the Sudeten Germans had been robbed of their 
privileged position in the social hierarchy of Central 
Europe. For the Germans in Czechoslovakia, in lieu of the 
problems rising from Czech land reform and the 
social/emotional loss of their previous privileged status, 
the Czech state created by the Treaty of Versailles began to 
embody the consequences of Hitler's proclaimed "stab in the 
back." 
By the end of the 1920's, although Czechs and Germans 
in Czechoslovakia had an economically symbiotic 
relationship, bitterness and ethnic tension intensified 
throughout the Sudetenland. The Germans claimed lack of 
adequate representation in the Czech government while the 
government answered such accusations with statistics and 
assertions which failed to address the real problems in the 
Sudetenland. The financial collapse of 1929 pushed these 
A mere 200,000 more ha throughout all of Czechoslovakia. 
See note #14 above. 
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German-Czech tensions even further toward a crisis. 
Throughout Czechoslovakia the depression shook the 
industrial foundations of the new Republic. Relevant to the 
Sudeten issue was the widespread perception among the German 
population that economic distress in Czechoslovakia was most 
evident in German industrial areas. Luza describes the 
atmosphere of the depression as a climate within which the 
language of political extremists took hold among the 
distressed German population of Czechoslovakia: 
As the catastrophic slumps of the years 1930-33 
assumed greater proportions, the social and 
political structure of the borderlands underwent 
changes that made the people respond more easily 
to radical programs which promised early and easy 
improvement. 
Luza is of course referring to the forces of Communism and 
Nazism. After several unsuccessful attempts at establishing 
a Nazi Party in Czechoslovakia, many of which were thwarted 
by Czech officials, a high school gym teacher by the name of 
Konrad Henlein was able to consolidate the National 
Socialist movement in Czechoslovakia (thenceforth called the 
"Sudeten German Party") and establish himself at its head. 
Ibid, p. 15. 
Ibid, pp. 15-16. 
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acting with the direct support of Adolf Hitler. After 
Hitler's rise to power in 1933, Henlein and the Nazis of 
Czechoslovakia gained a powerful voice in the increasingly 
volatile situation in the Sudetenland. 
The depression unleashed into Central Europe forces of 
belligerent and intolerable government. In Czechoslovakia, 
the rise of the Nazi party increased the troublesome nature 
of the Sudeten question as the Germans there became more 
vocal and aggressive in their quest for autonomy. On May 
13, 1936, the Czechoslovak government passed the National 
Defense Act in an attempt to get a handle on the impending 
crisis in the Sudetenland. Through this law, the government 
acquired extensive powers over industries essential to 
national security. The government acquired the right to 
dismiss from their work all persons "unreliable in the eyes 
of the State.In January of 1937, the Czech government 
declared through the "Machnik Decree" that it claimed the 
right to limit the number of Sudeten German employees in 
U.S. Department of State, Documents on German Foreign 
Policy. 1918-1945: Series D (1937-1945) Volume II. Germany 
and Czechoslovakia. 1937-1938 report from Ernst Eisenlohr, 
the German Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, to the German 
Foreign Ministry, October 11, 1937, (Washington: GPO, 1946), 
p. 12 . 
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firms applying for government contracts.^® At the end of 
June, 1937, the government passed a further law, against the 
opposition of the Sudeten German Party, which made military 
training compulsory for all citizens of Czechoslovakia, to 
include women.®® 
The promulgation of the National Defense Law and the 
further mobilization of the Czech nation evoked loud 
criticism from the Sudeten German population. On October 
11, 1937, Ernst Eisenlohr, the German Foreign Ministry 
Representative in Prague, sent a report to the German 
Foreign Ministry in Berlin in which he listed several 
grievances filed against the Czech government by Germans. 
At the head of the list were several complaints stemming 
from the administrative treatment of Germans by the 
government under the auspices of the National Defense Act. 
The letter specifically mentioned expulsions, refusals of 
labor permits, and the seizure of German real estate in the 
name of national security. Furthermore, the letter cited 
discrimination against the Nazi Party in Czechoslovakia to 
Ibid, letter from Konrad Henlein to the German Foreign 
Minister (Eisenlohr), November 9, 1937, p. 51. 
" Ibid. 
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include censorship of Party literature and an outright ban 
on Mein Kampf.^° Eisenlohr criticized the duplicity in 
Czech President Eduard Benes's rhetoric and policy: 
...President Bens had demanded [of the 
Sudeten Germans] a better knowledge of the 
Czechs. How was it possible to get to know 
each other if every statement on what today 
is engrossing all Germany is nervously kept 
from the eyes of the Czechoslovak people?®^ 
On October 17, 1937, the tension between the Sudeten 
German Party and the Czech government turned violent. Karl 
Herman Frank, State Secretary in the Reich Propaganda 
Ministry, was arrested during a Party function at Telpitz-
Schoengau. The German press in Czechoslovakia 
sensationalized the incident and published fictional 
accounts of a truncheon attack launched against members of 
the Party. In his report to Berlin, Eisenlohr described 
the incident as a Czech reaction caused by their increasing 
concern over the rise of Hitler in Germany and the Nazis' 
activities in Czechoslovakia: "...the conviction has been 
Ibid, p. 11. 
" Ibid, p. 15. 
Ibid, report from Eisenlohr to the German Foreign 
Ministry, October 22, 1937, p. 20. 
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strengthened in the government and in wide circles of the 
population that even more must be done...for the security of 
the Republic, internally and externally."" The incident at 
Telpitz-Schoengau caused ripples in the Nazi Party felt by 
the elite of the Party. Hitler's propaganda minister, 
Joseph Goebbels, ordered an anti-Czech campaign which 
flooded Party newspapers throughout Central Europe with 
anti-Czech propaganda from October 17 to November 3, 1937.®^ 
By the end of 1937, Czechs and Sudeten Germans had 
effectively withdrawn into two partisan camps: The Czechs 
supported by President Benes and the Czechoslovak 
Government, and the Sudeten Germans backed by Hitler and the 
Third Reich. In December, 1937, at Jaegerndorf in 
Northeastern Moravia, the Czech Government evoked the 
National Defense Act in a massive expropriation of tenants 
and landowners. On December 18, members of the Foreign 
Ministry in Berlin met to discuss reciprocal countermeasures 
to be taken against Czech nationals living in Germany: 
It was argued that 28 orders of expropriation 
should be issued along the same lines of 
Ibid, p. 21. [emphasis added] 
Ibid, minute from the German Foreign Ministry, Berlin, 
November 3, 193 7, p. 29. 
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procedure as was provided for in the 
Czechoslovak National Defense Law, and that 
120 summary dismissals should be ordered.®® 
The deadline for the execution of these reprisals was set 
for February 1, 1938, with the writs of expulsion to be 
delivered by Christmas.®® On December 22, the initial 
reprisals were ordered by the Government of the Third 
Reich. On that same day, Adolf Hitler proposed that the 
ratio of reprisals against Czech nationals be increased from 
1:1 (with relation to the expropriations at Jaegerndorf) to 
2:1.®' 
Throughout 193 8, this pathological atmosphere of 
reciprocity between Czechs and Germans gained fearful 
momentum. In March, 500,000 Germans staged demonstrations 
throughout the Sudetenland. Their demands for autonomy 
within the borders of Czechoslovakia were a well-established 
rallying cry of the Sudeten German Party.®® On April 2, 
Ibid, minute from the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin, 
December 18, 1937, p. 77. 
®® Ibid. 
®^ Ibid, letter from the German Foreign Ministry to the 
German Legation in Czechoslovakia, December 22, 1937, p. 92. 
®® Ibid, minute from the German Foreign Ministry, December 
22, 1937, p. 93. 
Ibid, report from Eisenlohr to the German Foreign 
6 0  
Eisenlohr reported to the German Foreign Ministry that the 
Government had begun supplying Czechs living in the 
Sudetenland with arms. At the same time, the Sudeten 
German Party called for the establishment of a uniformed 
German volunteer force in the Sudetenland.^^ On April 9, 
1938, Eisenlohr filed the following report to the German 
Foreign Ministry: 
Feelings becoming more violent in last few 
days in Sudeten area. K.H. Frank's 
secretary... described situation as 
"catastrophic and shattering." All classes 
of population from manufacturers to 
unemployed openly characterize negotiations 
of Sudeten German Party with Czechoslovak 
Government... as betrayal. Nor would autonomy 
protect Sudeten German area.... Tension is 
so great that a single shot for Sudeten 
Germans would start blood bath among 
Czechs . 
Ministry, March 31, 1938, p. 209. 
Ibid, report from Eisenlohr to the German Foreign 
'Ministry, April 2, 193 8, pp. 213-214. 
Ibid, letter from the German Foreign Ministry to 
Eisenlohr, April 6, 1937, 215. The German Foreign Ministry 
asked Eisenlohr to convey their wishes to the Sudeten German 
Party that the formation of such a militia be postponed for 
the present. Plans were already in the making for the 
legitimate annexation of the Sudetenland, and an outright 
civil war in the region would not have served the intentions 
of the Reich. 
Ibid, report from Eisenlohr to the German Foreign 
Ministry, April 9, 1938, p. 226. 
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The fragmented and desperate nature of Eisenlohr's 
message was not lost on Hitler. As will be discussed in 
Chapter 4, Hitler used the tense situation in Czechoslovakia 
as an excuse for the further need to protect the "members of 
the German Nation" living outside the borders of Germany. 
A pattern for pathological revenge was thus, by April, 
1938, well established between Czechoslovakia and Germany. 
This vindictive pattern had roots in pre-Versailles Europe. 
Although Czech officials declared the opposite, and the 
actions of many seemed to be genuine, even apologists for 
the behavior of the Czech government during the first years 
of the Republic must admit that the Czechs discriminated 
against the Germans living in their country. Among other 
sources, this discrimination undoubtedly arose from a desire 
among the freshly-independent Czech nation for retribution 
for centuries of domination by and "servitude"^^ to the 
German nation. If we return to the language of Thomas 
Scheff, the desire among Czechs for reprisals against the 
See J.W. Breugel, "The Germans in Pre-War 
Czechoslovakia," in A History of the Czechoslovak Republic. 
1918-1948 Victor Mamety and Radomir Luza, eds. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 169-170, 173, 185, 
187 . 
See Kennan below. 
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Sudeten Germans could be a product of "shameful" emotions 
caused by generations of German "envelopment." As a natural 
process of healing, the Czechs, even without the entirely 
punitive backdrop created by the peace Diktat of 1918 would 
have been naturally compelled to exact some form of revenge 
against the Germans to atone for their own subjugation and 
humiliation. The Treaty of Versailles simply supplied 
legitimacy and amplified the idea of revenge directed 
against the Germans. Any action thus taken by the Czechs 
subsequently caused shameful emotions to build up within the 
German population of Czechoslovakia, emotions that would, in 
turn, undoubtedly manifest themselves in aggressive, 
vindictive behavior. 
The next step in this cycle of revenge was not far-off. 
Hitler was ready for the forceful annexation of the Central 
European lands^l^st to_the "German Nation" in the Treaty of 
Versailles. Czechoslovakia was part of this territory 
targeted as Lehensraum, or living space. In September of 
1938, the very Western Allies who had created Czechoslovakia 
in 1918 now withdrew their promised support at the infamous 
Munich Conference and actually authorized Hitler to occupy 
the Sudetenland. Once he secured that territory. Hitler 
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then set to work threatening the Czechoslovak government 
into capitulation and the surrender of the entire country to 
German forces. In March of 1939, with the total military 
abandonment of Czechoslovakia by her Western allies (most 
notably Britain and France) the government of President 
Benes fled into exile. Hitler coerced the new regime under 
President Emil Hacha to consent to Nazi "protection," and 
proceeded to occupy the country, renaming it the 
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and appointing SS 
Obengruppenfuehrer Konstantin von Neurath at the 
Reichsprotector of Bohemia and Moravia. Czechoslovakia thus 
ceased to exist. 
The Germans immediately set out to establish themselves 
in the role of "masters," reclaiming social superiority for 
the Sudeten Germans. A superiority that these members of 
Hitler's "German Nation" had enjoyed in the Austrian 
Hapsburg Empire until 1918. In material terms, the Germans 
began to reclaim property to which they perceived they had a 
traditional claim. George Kennan wrote in 1940 that the 
Czechs estimated that the value of property requisitioned by 
the Germans in one year of occupation at 22,000,000,000 
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Crowns, or between $500,000,000 and $1,000,000,000.^^ 
Furthermore, the idea of Lebensraum was manifested by the 
Germans in an increase in settlement. Shortly before the 
occupation, the population of Bohemia and Moravia was 
estimated at 6,804,000, of whom only 234,000 were ethnic 
Germans. By March of 1940, the total population of the 
Protectorate stood at 7,200,000. Of the Czechs originally 
living in the area, nearly 150,000 had relocated to Germany 
following the occupation. This would mean an influx of 
nearly 500,000 Germans to the Protectorate in just one year, 
bringing the total number of Germans to nearly 800,000, of 
which some 120,000 lived in Prague alone. Across the 
country, Czechs were forced out of high-level corporate, 
professional, and governmental positions. Furthermore, the 
Germans began to place limits on education and training 
programs for young Czechs in an effort to stifle the 
progressive potential for future generations of Czechs.^' 
In short, a new German elite replaced Czech in the new 
" George Kennan, From Prague after Munich: Diplomatic 
Papers. 1938-1940 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1968), p. 228. 
Ibid, p. 232. 
" Ibid, p. 234. 
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Protectorate in the course of one year. 
The German immigration also forced Czech culture out of 
the mainstream. Once an active part of the creative process 
in Central Europe, famous for music, literature, and cinema, 
Czech culture was reduced to the quiet cultivation of the 
language and artistic roots. The cinema industry in 
Czechoslovakia was totally Germanized, theater became "a 
sort of shrine for historical pageantry. Of Czech 
culture under the German occupation, George Kennan said the 
following: 
Popular imagination finds its expression 
mostly in the innumerable bitter jokes and 
rhymes and plays on words in which the 
average Czech seeks solace for his plight and 
which pass from mouth-to-mouth with a 
rapidity that even press and radio could 
scarcely improve on.^® 
With their nation occupied and themselves subjugated 
politically, economically, and culturally, the Czechs could 
have capitulated mentally in 1940, as the Protectorate 
government under Emil Hacha compelled them to do. However, 
much in the same way that Germany had reacted to its 
humiliation by the allies following World War I and had 
Ibid, p. 235. 
" Ibid. 
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subsequently sought satisfaction through revenge, however, 
the Czechs reacted vengefully to the German presence in 
their lands. A resistance movement emerged in the wake of 
occupation which conducted limited but continuous operations 
against the German occupation forces throughout the war. 
From the beginning of the resistance movement, Czech 
freedom fighters kept direct contact with the exiled 
government of President Benes, located in London. Indeed, 
throughout the occupation Benes encouraged the resistance 
movement through media broadcasts and propaganda 
publications. In a speech broadcast to the Czech people on 
June 24, 1941, Benes declared that "at the decisive moment 
we shall call you to the struggle which we are waging here 
with weapon in hand. Continue to remain united!"®" For the 
first few years of the war, the Czech resistance largely 
served as an intelligence gathering apparatus for the 
Allies. In the Spring of 1941, for example, Czech 
operatives accurately relayed the date for the onset of 
Operation BARBAROSSA, or the German invasion of Russia, to 
Transcript of Speech delivered by E. Benes to the Czech 
people, June 24, 1941, Great Britain, Public Record Office, 
Foreign Office, 371 series, #30841 [hereafter cited as 
Britain, PRO/FO]. 
67 
the Soviets.®^ 
With the entrance of the Soviet Union into the war, 
hopeful Czechs grew to expect an early victory for the 
Allies. In the Fall of 1941, the Czech resistance initiated 
several campaigns against the Germans.®^ The resistance 
movement took the form of active acts of sabotage and 
boycott, as well as covert acts of industrial sabotage in 
the factories. Reinhard Heydrich, then Deputy 
Reichsprotector, confessed in late 1941 that the new wave of 
resistance posed a definite threat to the unity of the 
Reich. In response to the new aggressive behavior of the 
Czech resistance. Hitler replaced Neurath with Heydrich as 
the Reichsprotector of Bohemia and Moravia. Heydrich 
immediately proclaimed martial law in the Protectorate and 
invested himself with absolute executive authority. In a 
speech whereby Heydrich declared a state of emergency, he 
announced that: 
Galium MacDonald, The Killing of SS-Obergruppenfuhrer 
Reinhard Heydrich (New York: The Free Press, 1989), pp. 70-
79 addresses the connection between the British S.O.E. and 
the Czech resistance, and p. 103 describes the accuracy of 
Czech intelligence. 
Luza, The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans p. 207. 
®' Ibid. 
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All actions violating public order, security, 
economic life or peaceful work, as well as 
the intentional possession of firearms or 
explosives or ammunition are subject to 
martial law... Whoever learns of such action 
or intentions without immediately reporting 
them...is also guilty and thus subject to 
martial law.®^ 
The day following Heydrich's declaration, six people 
were executed. From that point forward, daily executions 
were a regular occurrence throughout the Protectorate. 
During the night of October 7-8, 1941, less than one month 
after Heydrich declared martial law, over 800 instructors 
and staff from the Czech Sokol were arrested. Within eight 
months of the "state of emergency," only 60 to 70 of them 
were left alive.®® This new and brutal wave of retaliation 
by the Nazi administration in retaliation for Czech 
resistance earned Heydrich the title of the "Butcher of 
Prague." 
In response^foTT^drich's brutal system of repression, 
the exiled Czech government in London, in close 
collaboration with the British S.O.E.,®® developed and 
Ibid, pp. 207-208. 
Ibid, p. 209. 
Special Operations Executive: British special forces. 
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launched Operation ANTHROPOD. In January of 1942, 
Czechoslovakian Army Sergeants Jan Kubis and Josef Gabcik 
parachuted into the Protectorate with orders to assassinate 
Heydrich.®^ Once in Prague, the two agents found shelter in 
a series of safe houses established by JINDRA, a central 
contact organization of Czech agents that provided mutual 
security and support. 
On May 27, 1942, Gabcik and Kubis set an ambush for 
Heydrich's staff car on a Prague street corner. As 
Heydrich's car slowed to make the turn, Gabcik stepped out 
and attempted to fire his automatic rifle. His weapon 
malfunctioned. Kubis, on the opposite side of the street, 
hurled a bomb at the car which exploded, sending shrapnel 
into Heydrich's back. Although both Heydrich and his driver 
drew their weapons and attempted to pursue the attackers, 
Gabcik and Kubis escaped to JINDRA safe houses. Heydrich 
was rushed to a hospital where he underwent emergency 
surgery to repair the internal damage inflicted by the bomb. 
He developed an infection, and died of his wounds on June 4, 
1942 
MacDonald, pp. 123-125. 
MacDonald, pp. 169-173. Gunther Deschner, Reinhard 
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The German reaction to Heydrich's assassination was 
instantaneous. Karl Hermann Frank, Heydrich's immediate 
successor, declared a state of emergency, ordering that 
anyone guilty of aiding the assassins, indeed, anyone who 
condoned the act, be shot. Frank announced a reward of 
20,000,000 Crowns (about $300,000) for the return of the 
assassins and began to exact revenge for the attack. By 
June 5, some 17 0 people had already been executed by the 
Nazis for alleged connections to the attack.®® Frank made 
the intended extent of the Nazi revenge clear in a 
declaration in which he publicly announced that German 
authorities would execute not only the attackers, but their 
families and associates as well.®" Frank left Prague to 
personally report the situation to Hitler in Berlin, leaving 
Kurt Daleuge to assume the responsibilities of the office of 
Reich Protector. Daleuge immediately ordered that all Czech 
citizens report to the Nazi authorities to have their 
Heydrich: A Bioaraphv (New York: Stein and Day, 1977), pp. 
240-241. 
Report No. XIX from Eduard Benes regarding the Political 
situation in the Protectorate, 23rd May to 5th June, 1942, 
June 6, 1942, Britain, PRO/FO 371 series, #30837. 
Ibid. 
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identification cards stamped. Failure to comply meant 
execution. Across the Protectorate, more than 5,000 
communities underwent stringent house-by-house searches; 
more than four million citizens reported to German check-
stations; more than one thousand were arrested, some six 
hundred of whom were summarily executed.®^ 
Hitler's reaction to the news of Heydrich's death was 
even more emotional and extreme. He ordered that 3 0,000 
disloyal Czechs should be executed if Heydrich's assassins 
managed to escape capture. Though Frank was able to 
dissuade Hitler on the grounds that the Czech reaction to 
such a massacre would make the German position in the 
Protectorate untenable, the 'reign of terror' subsequently 
imposed by the German military instituted a program of 
deliberate revenge. By the end of the state of emergency in 
September, 3,188 Czechs had been arrested, and 1,357 
executed.®^ Julius Fuchik, a journalist imprisoned by the 
Germans in Prague, described the German reaction to the 
assassination as he experienced it in prison: 
The route from Pankrac to the Petschek Palace 
Luza, p. 209. 
Ibid, pp. 210-211. 
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[Gestapo headquarters] and back now becomes 
the daily Calvary for thousands of prisoners. 
The SS men, acting as overseers in cars, are 
taking revenge for Heydrich, Already before 
the prison car has made it the first mile, 
blood of dozens of prisoners is flowing from 
their bruised faces and mouths beaten with 
pistol butts.... 
...Every night one hears the roll call 
downstairs in the corridor. Fifty, a 
hundred, two hundred people whom they will 
load bound hand and foot into lorries... for 
mass executions. The guilt? ...they are not 
guilty. They were arrested, they are in no 
way connected with any of the major cases, 
neither are they needed for further 
investigations; they are, therefore, suited 
for death... 
Fuchik goes on to describe the discriminate killing of 
Czech prisoners at the hands of the police. Although his 
work must be analyzed very critically (he was, after all, a 
condemned prisoner of the German occupation forces), his 
description of the German process of revenge for Heydrich's 
assassination is important. He implies that the Germans 
intended to kill a certain number of Czechs (at least, as 
many as was practical), and that the majority of these 
people were killed because their usefulness in ongoing 
investigations was minimal. In other words, what Fuchik 
" Julius Fuchik, Notes from the Gallows. (New York: Gibbs 
Smith, 1990) pp. 72-74. Fuchik was executed by the Germans 
on September 8, 1943. 
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wants us to believe is that the Czech arrested in direct 
connection to the Heydrich investigation would live to see 
the completion of the investigation while the Czech arrested 
for a minimal offense such as expired identification papers 
was slated for execution. Though Fuchik's motivation for 
writing such a passage is perhaps driven by his own desire 
for revenge against the Germans, he does raise an important 
point. The execution of Hitler's orders was deliberate and 
careful; Czechs had to die to atone for Heydrich's death, 
but only those Czechs not essential to continuing 
investigations were killed during the Summer of 1942. 
On June 15, 1942, Sergeant Karel Curda, one of the 
Czech operatives, surrendered to the German authorities. 
From the information he provided, the Nazis were able to 
locate and raid several JINDRA safe houses, and further 
learned that seven parachutists, including Heydrich's 
assassins, were hiding in the Orthodox Church of St. Charles 
Borromeo in Prague. On June 18, over 700 Waffen-SS troops 
surrounded and searched the church. The German troops 
discovered the Czechs and, after a long and bitter fire 
fight which lasted most of the day, all seven Czech agents, 
running out of ammunition, committed suicide. Curda 
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identified the bodies of Kubis and Gabcik as Heydrich's 
assassins. In retaliation, the Nazis tortured and executed 
252 members of the assassins' families along with other 
Czechs who had aided JINDRA. In addition to the families 
and associates of the assassins, the Germans executed Bishop 
Gorazd, the Orthodox Bishop in Prague, along with several 
other members of the Orthodox clergy. In one final act of 
revenge for the assassination, the Nazis dissolved the 
Orthodox Church in the Protectorate in October, 1942.®^ 
The most infamous act of revenge committed by the 
German military occurred at the small mining village of 
Lidice. On June 8, 1942, Himmler remarked: "It is simply 
our duty to avenge the death of Heydrich.Less than 24 
hours later, on the evening of June 9, Frank telephoned the 
SS in Prague with the following orders regarding Lidice: 
1 All adult male inhabitants are to be shot; 
2 Females are to be evacuated to a 
concentration camp. 
3 The children are to be collected together; 
if capable of Germanization, they are to 
be delivered to SS-families of the Reich, 
MacDonald, p. 197. Luza, Transfer of the Sudeten Germans 
p. 212. 
Report No. XX from Eduard Bene_ regarding the Situation 
on the Protectorate from 7 to 12 June, 1942, June 12, 1942, 
Britain, PRO/FO 371 series, #30837. 
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and the rest are to undergo a different 
education; 
4 The place is to be burnt down and razed to 
the ground.®® 
The German military executed the orders with terrifying 
efficiency. As described in the introduction, the Germans 
surrounded the village on the evening of June 9. They 
allowed the workers returning from their jobs to enter the 
Lidice, but none could leave. The Germans established 
roadblocks and moved into the town. They loaded the women 
and children onto trucks and took them to the high school in 
nearby Kladno to await deportation to concentration camps. 
They assembled the men at a farmhouse and there executed 
them. The Germans then set the village ablaze and 
demolished the ruins with explosives. All told, the Germans 
killed 199 people in Lidice; 143 of the 184 women survived 
the concentration camps to return after the war; of the 98 
children of Lidice only 16 could be identified and contacted 
after the war. In order to drive home the message of 
revenge, the destruction of Lidice continued for four months 
following the initial retaliation as the Reich National 
Gunther Deschner, Reinhardt Heydrich: A Biography (New 
York: Stein and Day, 1981) p. 273. 
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Labor Service methodically removed all traces of the village 
from the countryside.®^ 
The question remains regarding the Nazi's choice of 
Lidice as a target for revenge. Why Lidice? It was a small 
mining village with a population no greater than 300, 
including children. A population of this size posed no 
serious threat whatever to the German occupation even in the 
case of armed revolt. Furthermore, the Germans never proved 
the existence of resistance activity in Lidice.®® After the 
destruction of the town, German investigators learned that 
SOE parachutists had been given addresses in Lidice, but 
they could make no such connection before June 10. Hitler 
needed a target for retribution, but the circumstances 
surrounding the destruction of Lidice were contrived at 
best; at worst, they were outright fabrications on the part 
" Ibid, p. 274. 
There are diverse and conflicting accounts in which the 
Germans claim to have found arms caches in Lidice, but these 
were discounted as false following the war. German troops 
located a radio transmitter in Kladno, but this happened 
after the fact and was never connected to Lidice. The 
closest alleged connection between Lidice and the Czech 
resistance movement were the Horack and Stribrny families, 
both of Lidice, whose sons had gone abroad in 193 9 and had 
not been heard from since. The German investigators assumed 
that they were involved in the resistance but were, again, 
unable to prove anything of the sort. 
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of the German command. 
Though the reasons for selecting Lidice may not be 
perfectly clear, the policy of the SS toward Czechs during 
the summer of 1942 may provide some insights. As Fuchik 
implied in his observations, those Czechs arrested who had 
no connection to ongoing investigations were probable 
candidates for execution. The German command remained 
absolutely intent on the capture of all resistance and SOE 
operatives in Czechoslovakia, and were therefore quite 
unwilling to immediately execute prisoners that might help 
the investigation, though their crimes against the 
Protectorate might be more serious than others. A problem 
arose, then, regarding the means of satisfying Hitler's 
demand for blood vengeance. The solution, of course, was to 
answer Hitler's call for Czech blood with petty offenders. 
It stands to reason then, that this policy of detaining 
worthwhile suspects for investigative purposes while 
offering the lives of unimportant suspects to satisfy the 
emotional need for revenge could have translated to the 
selection of Lidice. The town had no strategic, political, 
or tactical importance, thus bypassing the potential loss of 
critical war material. Lidice was physically close to 
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Prague, thus ensuring that its destruction would be well-
noted. Also, Lidice had a relatively small population 
concentrated in a small space, thus making the task of 
complete destruction easier than destroying the urban areas 
of Prague into which the assassins fled immediately 
following the attack. It served the dual needs of the 
German command perfectly--quick retribution with minimal 
loss to the investigation process. 
While it fit the profile of the Nazi's needs, the 
inherent problem with the selection of Lidice is obvious. 
It is of diminutive stature. The destruction of a village 
of 200 plus inhabitants might go unnoticed in a struggle 
with the gigantic magnitude of World War II. It makes sense 
that a war-waging government exacting revenge for the death 
of a major statesman would certainly want the revenge to 
occur on a grand scale to display, internally and 
externally, both the determination of that government to 
maintain power and the peril faced by all who stood in its 
way. A radio bulletin announcing the destruction of a small 
mining village might, at best, excite a reaction along the 
lines of "big deal" from European urban centers, the grim 
populations of which wrestled daily with destruction that 
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overshadowed the horror of the events at Lidice. To ensure 
that the message got across to all enemies, the Nazis 
documented their efforts at Lidice in excruciating detail. 
They photographed and filmed the process of destruction. On 
June 11, the German Government made an official radio 
declaration: 
In the course of the search for the Murderers 
of SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Heydrich irrefutable 
indications have been secured that the 
population of the village of Lidice u Kladna 
afforded support and assistance to 
the...criminals.... 
As the inhabitants of this 
village... have offended in the most crude 
fashion against the published laws the male 
adults have been shot, the women taken to 
concentration camps and the children sent 
away, so that they may be given the 
appropriate education. The buildings in the 
village have been razed to the ground and its 
name erased." 
Not an unfortunate atrocity to be swept under the carpet. 
Benes, Report No. XX. 
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the "Murder of Lidice"^°° was proclaimed loudly to the world. 
The reasoning behind the selection of Lidice should be 
clear by now, but what, exactly did the Nazis achieve by 
making an example of the small community? Some of the 
immediate German reactions to the event provide an 
indication as to the effectiveness of the Nazis response to 
the shock of Heydrich's assassination. Vojtech Mastny, a 
Czech national who served on the faculties of many U.S. 
universities, describes the enthusiasm with which Germans 
greeted news of the destruction of Lidice: 
100 Murder of Lidice" is the title of a 1942 poem by 
Edna St. Vincent Millay. 
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The Protectorate chief of the German Reich 
Labor Service, in which party members were 
required to serve limited terms as workers, 
commented on the "moral lesson" which the 
leveling of Lidice gave to his men: "The man 
who has been assigned to this spot 
intensifies his feelings, thus contributing 
to the strengthening of German power. The 
full effect will be achieved when his work 
obliterates all traces of the village and on 
the very spot where the enemy of Germandom 
used to live the earth is turned under the 
plow. 
Furthermore, Mastny writes, "The Security Service reported 
that the German population of Bohemia and Moravia welcomed 
the atrocity with 'great satisfaction and in many cases open 
joy...; they even say that officials in high places will now 
perceive how the Czechs should be treated. ' This 
reaction indicates that the blood revenge demanded by Hitler 
had successfully achieved the goals of retribution through 
revenge. The rationale follows a logical progression--the 
Nazis needed a quick and easy vent for revenge, and Lidice 
fit the requisite profile perfectly. 
Lest we get swept up in the cold dispassionate tide of 
rationale, it is important to look at the peculiarities of 
Mastny, p. 217. 
Ibid. 
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Lidice's demise and understand it as an anomaly, albeit a 
small one, within the destructive framework of World War II. 
Very few populations in Europe experienced the per capita 
destruction suffered by the residents of Lidice. Close to 
two thirds of the population was either murdered on the spot 
or died in concentration camps. Beyond that, most of the 
children of Lidice never returned from their fosterage in 
German families. Furthermore, after the war, only a few dim 
outlines of building foundations remained on the Czech 
countryside that would suggest that the village of Lidice 
had ever existed. The remnants of Lidice consisted mainly 
of a handful of survivors and their memories of the place. 
Though other urban centers throughout Europe suffered much 
more destruction in direct comparison with Lidice, pound-
for-pound few suffered destruction with the totality that 
the survivors of Lidice faced. While logically and 
thoroughly planned and carried-out, the destruction of 
Lidice clearly stands as a tragic atrocity and an 
unparalleled act of revenge . 
There were a number of towns destroyed in the same manner 
as Lidice during the war, but none were a direct, vengeful 
response to acts of defiance against the Nazis on the same 
magnitude as Heydrich's assassination. 
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The relationship between Germany and Czechoslovakia 
between 1918 and 1942, and indeed to the end of the war when 
the Czech government deported much of the German population 
in Czechoslovakia to Germany,"^ indicates, in part, a well-
established pattern of pathological revenge. The 
destruction of Lidice was a singular and remarkable instance 
in a cycle of retribution that began with the creation of 
the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918. Due largely to the 
insensitivity of the Versailles peacemakers to the ethnic 
particularities of the region, tension developed immediately 
that, while subtle at first, would eventually erupt into 
violence and outright savagery. If the memory of Lidice can 
serve the peacemaking process at all today, especially in 
light of the tragedies of the last few years in the Balkans 
and Central Asia, it must serve to show the importance of 
ethnicity and emotions in the behavior of the populations of 
nation states. Failure to take the importance of emotions 
into account, contemporary efforts at peacemaking will never 
adequately compensate for the inevitability of partisanship 
See Radomir Luza, The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans. 
and revenge. 
chapter IV 
Textual Analysis—Documents 
To explain the willingness with which human beings 
undertake a vengeful endeavor along the lines of Lidice, it 
is necessary to examine the fundamental values of human 
society and illuminate the sources which legitimize and 
determine the magnitude of revenge. To the intellectual 
historian, the writing and orations of Adolf Hitler can 
provide a glimpse the vengeful pulse within Nazi society. 
As Chapter 5 will reveal, the nature of a totalitarian 
regime mandates a study of the values communicated by the 
elite to the populace. In order for a totalitarian 
political system to succeed, as the Nazis did for some time, 
the population must largely accept the values and will of 
the elite. These values and will of the totalitarian ruler 
serve, therefore, to direct the behavior of a united 
national population. For the purposes of this study, then, 
the language of Adolf Hitler provides many useful insights 
to the general values of permissiveness toward revenge 
projected by the Nazis into German social values and 
behavior. 
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Hitler's magnum opus, Mein Kampf. is itself a study in 
reciprocity and revenge: Obsessed with regaining Germany's 
anima, disgraced and downtrodden in the Treaty of 
Versailles, Hitler identifies the necessity to reclaim past 
greatness and outlines a definitive path to the completion 
of his aims. In the years following the Nazi's rise to 
power, Germany would, by and large, follow the mandate 
detailed by Hitler. Though he does not specify widespread 
revenge in particular as a course for reclaiming German 
greatness. Hitler does use language in his book that 
provides potentially permissive attitudes toward the idea of 
revenge as it was enacted at Lidice. 
In Mein Kampf. Hitler focuses on the humiliation of the 
German nation at the hands of the Western allies following 
World War I. This humiliation, mandated by the Treaty of 
Versailles, resulted, according to Hitler, from betrayal 
within German society rather than from military defeat. He 
emphasizes (correctly) that the German army held its 
positions in foreign territory at the end of the war. To 
Hitler, this indicated some measure of military victory. 
The German capitulation cannot, then, be clearly justified 
in the light of military defeat. In order to explain the 
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acceptance of the allies' terms at Versailles, Hitler 
fabricates and details what he called a Marxist-Jewish 
revolution that undermined the weak political system and 
shattered the very foundations of German society during the 
war, thus providing the "stab in the back" that compromised 
the heroic military "victory" achieved by the German army.^°^ 
In Mein Kampf. Versailles and the subsequent humiliation of 
Germany provide the prime rallying point for potential 
German revenge. 
Throughout his writings and speeches. Hitler uses 
language that, when analyzed using the methods outlined in 
Chapter II, illuminates the shame/rage cycle developed by 
Lewis, Retzinger and Scheff. Hitler evokes shame values by 
using such words as, "cowardice,"^"® "decay, "weakness,"^"® 
. .the assertion that the lost War was the cause of the 
German collapse [was] a lie. ...this military collapse was 
itself ...the consequence of a large number of symptoms of 
disease.... This was first the consequence...of an ethical 
and moral poisoning...which for many years had begun to 
undermine the foundations of the people and the Reich." 
Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf. trans, by Ralph Manheim (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1943), p. 231. "...these 
parliamentary rabble [under the direct influence of a 
Marxist-Jewish movement] stole and struck from the hand of a 
nation its weapon of self-preservation [the army]...." ibid, 
p. 272. 
Ibid, p. 230. 
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to describe the nature and effects of the Marxist-Jewish 
"revolution" that caused the collapse of Germany. This 
discourse evokes feelings of alienation, which in turn 
produce the emotion of shame. As mentioned in Chapter 2, 
the emotionally painful nature of a shameful experience may 
lead to neurosis and aggressive/destructive behavior. 
In Mein Kampf, Hitler illuminates clear targets against 
which the German nation should direct its aggression. 
Foremost among these are Jews and Marxists, as they are the 
forces which Hitler alleges to have directly caused the 
shaming of Germany. While the majority of the text is 
devoted to exposing this imagined conspiracy and detailing 
the manner in which it has attempted to destroy German 
society. Hitler does venture beyond his constructed fantasy 
to target more tangible targets as well. Principal among 
these is the Treaty of Versailles. While Hitler's 
destructive "revolution" of 1918 is largely imaginary, he 
uses the Treaty and all its disastrous effects on Germany as 
evidence of the result of the subversive activities of 
Ibid, p. 246. 
Ibid, p. 272. 
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Marxists and Jews. In this light, the mandates of the 
Treaty represent a clear threat to Germandom, and thus 
provide clear targets for vengeful (pathological) rage among 
Germans. 
While Hitler's evocative language regarding the tragic 
erosion of German values, a process that led to the defeat 
(shaming)^"® of the German nation, reveals general emotions 
related to vengeful and aggressive values, the tie between 
the Treaty of Versailles and the creation of the 
Czechoslovak Republic narrows the scope of vengeful emotions 
to focus on the subject of this study. As historian Raoul 
de Roussey de Sales comments in My World Order; 
Hitler promised his people to deliver them 
from the shackles of the Versailles Treaty 
and to do so against any opposition. The 
Versailles Treaty was not only unjust to the 
Germans and intolerable, it was also a threat 
to the peace of Europe. Until the wrongs of 
that treaty were righted, there could be no 
peace for any nation. 
By making the connection between Czechoslovakia and the 
Treaty, Hitler describes Czechoslovakia as a tool of the 
See Chapter II. 
Adolf Hitler, My New Order, edited with commentary by 
Raoul de Roussy de Sales, (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 
1941) , 452 . 
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"Western democracies" used to harm Germans and German 
interests. Throughout the entire section of his April 28, 
1939 speech to the Reichstag that deals with Czechoslovakia, 
Hitler describes the Western Allies' intent to use 
Czechoslovakia as a platform from which to launch an assault 
on Germany. Hitler's intentions in connecting 
Czechoslovakia and the Allies is evident in the following 
passage from that speech: 
The democratic peacemakers of Versailles can 
take the credit for having assigned to this 
Czech people the special role of satellite 
state, capable of being used against Germany. 
...they did violence to other nationalities 
in order to give a firm basis to a state 
which was to incorporate a latent threat to 
the German Nation in Central Europe. 
For this state, in which the so-called 
predominant national element was actually a 
minority, could be maintained only by means 
of brutal assault. . . . 
Hitler's language illuminates shameful emotions. 
Germany is threatened with violence, and brutal assault. 
The source of these threats? The Czech people. Hitler thus 
evokes shame through alienation and threat, and further 
identifies the cause of the shame, thereby identifying a 
Adolf Hitler, Official Translation of the Speech 
Delivered by Adolf Hitler before the German Reichstag on 
April 28. 1939 (Washington: German Embassy, 1939), 14. 
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target for vindictive aggression. 
Also clear in this passage is Hitler's intent to 
intimately connect the mistreatment of Germans in 
Czechoslovakia to the Germans in Germany under the broad 
construct of ethnic nationhood. The Allies and the Czechs 
did not assault and harm states and countries, they harmed 
people, specifically "other nationalities" and the "German 
Nation." An emotional response might be less acutely felt 
if it is a reaction to an abstract construction such as a 
state or a border or a country. When, however, the object 
of aggression is given some sort of direct connection to 
humanity such as "nationalities" or ethnic "nations," the 
connection between the victim and the perceiver is cast in 
human terms, and is therefore more intimate. By describing 
a pattern of abuse directed against Germans as people, 
rather than Germany as a state, and further connecting these 
abuses to the shame of Versailles, Hitler enables his 
audience to experience an emotional response which justifies 
vengeful action. While Hitler's speech to the Reichstag was 
primarily aimed at addressing Western opposition to the 
German occupation of Czechoslovakia, he also used language 
that could have permitted German citizens and soldiers to 
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develop values that enabled them to accept and participate 
in acts of revenge against Czechs. 
Another source which reveals projected permission for 
revenge is Hitler's speech to the Reichstag, of April 28, 
1939.^^^ Here again, Hitler's language provides some 
insights to the manner in which Hitler regarded the Czechs 
specif ically. Throughout the section in which Hitler 
addresses Germany and Czechoslovakia, he defends the German 
occupation as beneficial for all of Central Europe. Hitler 
begins by making a tie between ethnic Germans and the 
territories of Bohemia and Moravia. Following the 
"inexplicable" migration of Germans from these lands, "...a 
foreign Slav people made its way into this territory and 
made a place for itself between the remaining Germans."^" 
This statement casts the Czechs in the role of unwanted 
guests, if not actual invaders. 
Hitler furthermore claims that the destinies of the 
One month following the German occupation of 
Czechoslovakia. 
Hitler, Official Translation of the Speech Delivered by 
Adolf Hitler before the German Reichstag on April 28. 1939. 
Ibid, p. 13. 
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Czech people and the Germans are interlocked and that the 
Czechs are dependent on Germany for their continued 
existence due to the strong ties between the two nations. 
This dependence, according to Hitler, is evident at many 
different levels. The countries are economically 
indivisible. Hitler claims that the Czechs can not exist as 
an independent economic entity "..except on the basis of a 
relationship with the German Nation and the German 
e c o n o m y . H i t l e r  go e s  o n  t o  d e c l a r e  t h a t  t h e  " C z e c h  
economy owes its existence to the fact of having been part 
of the great German economic system. In addition to 
economic ties. Hitler describes Czech culture as being 
primarily dependent upon German culture. His claim is 
evident in the following: 
The Czech nation is in its origin foreign to 
us, but in the thousand years in which the 
two peoples have lived side by side, Czech 
culture has in the main been formed and 
moulded by German influences.... The capital 
of this country was for a time a German 
imperial city, and it contains the oldest 
German university. Numerous cathedrals, town 
halls, and palaces of nobility and citizen 
class bear witness to the influence of German 
Ibid. 
Ibid, pp. 13-14. 
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culture . 
In this language, Hitler describes the economic and 
cultural dependence of Czechoslovakia on Germany and in 
doing so creates a parasitic relationship between Czech 
society and German society that places the Czechs in the 
role of wards of the German state and German culture/^® 
This idea of wardenship would endure to the end of the war. 
On February 21, 1945, one of Hitler's assistants, 
Martin Bormann, recorded the following as part of Hitler's 
political testament: 
...we could not tolerate in the heart of 
Germany an abscess, small though it was, like 
an independent Czech state. We lanced the 
abscess in March, 1939, but in circumstances 
that were psychologically less favorable than 
those which would have obtained [sic] had we 
settled the issue by force in 1938. For in 
March, 1939, for the first time, we put 
ourselves in the wrong eyes of world opinion. 
No longer were we restricting ourselves to 
reuniting Germans to the Reich, but we were 
establishing a protectorate over a non-German 
Ibid, pp. 13, 14. 
Here, another aspect of the shame/rage theories developed 
by Lewis, Retzinger, and Scheff is evident. In other cases 
examined in this work. Hitler's language carries connotative 
meanings that evoke shame as a result of alienation through 
distancing or separation. Here, the language evokes shame 
through envelopment or uncomfortable proximity. 
95 
population. 
As the wardens of Czechoslovakia, then, Germans are 
responsible for its continued well-being as a part of the 
German nation. With any superior-subordinate relationship, 
there must exist at least an implied set of limits to 
regulate behavior. Whether it is the relationship between 
military leaders and their troops, teachers and students, or 
parents and children, there are accepted norms which address 
unacceptable behavior and reprisal or punishment. If a 
soldier stands guilty of insubordination, he may be reduced 
in rank. A student who distracts other students from their 
work may be sent to detention. A child who disobeys her 
parents may be subject to "time out" or a spanking. 
Similarly, when the Czechs reacted with defiance to the 
German occupation, they were, in the German perception, in 
Francois Genoud, ed.. The Testament of Adolf Hitler: The 
Hitler-Bormann Documents. February-April, 1945. trans by 
R.H. Stevens, (London: Cassell, 1959) p. 84. 
96 
need of corrective guidance. This guidance is not wholly 
punitive and negative in nature. When we discipline our own 
children, it is not to shame and harm them, but to correct 
their transgressions and help them to learn acceptable 
behavior. If German soldiers at Lidice possessed 
(consciously or subconsciously) this idea of wardenship of 
Czechs, it would enable them to carry out the atrocities at 
Lidice with the knowledge that their actions were not 
exclusively aimed at harming people, but by doing so they 
were helping the Czech nation to realize acceptable behavior 
that would promote harmony between Czechs and Germans. 
Hitler raises another issue in this speech, one to 
which he would return whenever confronted with the Czech 
question. He details the brutal Czech mistreatment of the 
Germans, and in such light describes the German occupation 
of Czechoslovakia as an effort to protect Germans living 
within the Czech borders. As Hitler describes his motives: 
"Germany was primarily interested in one thing only and that 
was to liberate the nearly four million Germans in this 
country from their unbearable situation. . . . 
Hitler, Speech Before the Reichstag, April 
28, 1939, p. 15. 
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Hitler first puts this mistreatment in historical context. 
He states that, 
...nearly four million Germans lived in this 
territory of Bohemia and Moravia [after the 
majority of the German nation had migrated 
westward]. A policy of national annihilation 
which set in, particularly after the Treaty 
of Versailles, under pressure of the Czech 
majority combined, too, with economic 
conditions and the rising tide of distress, 
led to the emigration of these German 
elements, so that the Germans left in the 
territory were reduced to approximately 3.7 
million."' 
In this excerpt. Hitler mentions two issues aimed at 
evoking an emotional response from his audience. First, he 
speaks in general of a program of "national annihilation" 
directed against Germans. By doing so, he has overtly laid 
the foundation for the justification of his occupation of 
Czechoslovakia. More important to this study, though, is 
the implicit meaning and effects of Hitler's language. The 
idea of national annihilation directed against Germans can 
excite in all Germans who read or hear this speech a 
vindictive reaction. 
Ibid, p. 13. Annihilation and distress resulting from 
the Treaty of Versailles indicates the presence of 
alienation, shame, and a target for aggression. 
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We do not need to examine the work of a sociologist 
such as Scheff to understand a society-wide vengeful impulse 
in this context. When people see or hear about members of 
their group, whether it be a family, a team, an army, or a 
nation, being harmed, they naturally experience an emotional 
reaction that generates a desire to see the perpetrator(s) 
brought to justice. Americans need only look back to their 
reaction to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. 
The United States followed the shame/rage cycle in textbook 
fashion through the language of President Roosevelt and the 
almost instantaneous declaration of war. In more recent 
memory, Americans can look to the Oklahoma City bombing of 
April, 1995, or the disaster that befell a platoon of US 
Army Rangers in Somalia in 1994, to recall painful feelings 
of loss (exposure, vulnerability, shame) and their 
emotionally vindictive reactions to these events. When we 
saw video footage of the Ranger being dragged through the 
crowded streets, we, as a national group, wanted to see the 
guilty parties punished. 
Language that evokes shame (in accordance with the 
theories of Lewis, Retzinger, and Scheff), while key in 
understanding the manner in which nonpathological people are 
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"permitted" to engage in pathological behavior, is not the 
only indicator of the values projected upon the German 
population by Hitler. In addition to evoking shameful 
emotions and establishing targets for vindictive aggression, 
Hitler provides justification for aggressive behavior 
through the language with which he examines the submission 
of one state to another prefaces his attitude toward 
territories conquered by the Nazis and the peoples who 
inhabited these lands: 
That the stain of cowardly submission can 
never be effaced; that the drop of poison in 
the blood of a people is passed on to 
posterity and will paralyze and undermine the 
strength of later generations...; even the 
loss of this freedom after a bloody and 
honorable struggle assures the rebirth of a 
people and its seed of life from which some 
day a new tree will strike fast roots. 
Though he is referring directly to the German nation, the 
values held by Hitler regarding Czechoslovakia can be 
extracted from the text. The message here is twofold. 
First, Hitler condemns any society that willingly passes its 
sovereign torch to another power without a struggle. Such a 
society, such a race that submits willingly, has forever 
Hitler, Mein Kampf. p. 669. 
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compromised its fundamental honor and integrity, and has 
lost any rightful potential to continue as a society. This 
view lends a permissive attitude toward German aggression in 
an attempt to assuage the effects of shameful emotions 
{"cowardly submission [will] paralyze and undermine the 
strength of later generations"). Hitler's language also 
serves to justify the harsh treatment of Czechs due to their 
willing capitulation to Germany in 1939. As they gave up 
without a nationalized resistance, as a people, the Czechs 
lost their vitality as potentially progressive human beings. 
To strip the argument to its bones-- since the Czechs 
submitted willingly, their destruction is imminent and 
necessary lest their 'poisoned blood' come to infect the 
rightful German conquerors. To kill Czechs is not, 
according to Hitler's values, an abomination, it is simply 
speeding them toward their inevitable destiny. Hitler 
details this idea further: 
For this is the 'drop of poison' of which 
Clausewitz speaks: the spinelessness which 
once begun must increase more and more and 
which gradually becomes the foulest heritage, 
burdening every future decision. It can only 
become a terrible lead weight, a weight which 
a nation is not likely to shake off, but 
which finally drags it down into the 
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existence of a slave race. 
In this passage, Hitler notes the qualifier that he 
mentioned beforehand. He states that the "poisoned" society 
is "not likely" to shake off the weight of past cowardice. 
This qualified statement suggests that if a society does 
resist, it can counter the otherwise terminal effects of 
cowardice. This second part of Hitler's statement exposes 
another facet of his permissive attitude toward revenge. 
Hitler suggests that a nation that resists the encroachment 
of another, though the first may be overcome and occupied, 
maintains confident assurance that they will eventually rise 
again to regain their past stature. With reference to the 
assassination of Heydrich, this idea takes on tremendous 
importance. If a country resists occupation, it plants the 
"seed of life from which some day a new tree will strike 
fast roots. 
In order to ensure ongoing Nazi primacy in the 
conquered territories, any hints of resistance must be dealt 
Ibid, p. 67 0. Again, Hitler's language evokes shame: 
spinelessness will drag the nation down to the existence of 
a slave race. 
Ibid. 
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with swiftly and severely. Hitler's awareness of the rise 
of the Nazi party, both in speculative preview in Mein Kampf 
in 1925 and in reflection in 1942, made him sensitive to the 
potential of uprisings. "Passive resistance will never 
drive off occupying armies. This language projects 
permissive values with regards to revenge in two ways: It 
evokes shame within German society for their past passivity 
in accepting defeat following World War I and also demands a 
savage response to Heydrich's assassination. This second, 
connotative meaning is evident if the voice of the phrase is 
inverted from passive to active: Active resistance will 
drive off occupying armies. Here, Hitler combines shades of 
past shame with the necessity to crush any active opposition 
to Germany's reemergence. As such. Hitler's language 
mandates active retaliation against threats to Germany's 
necessary ascension and expansion--a style of retaliation 
manifested by the Germans at Lidice. Though Hitler intended 
these passages as a call to arms for the German nation in 
response to the Treaty of Versailles, they shed light on his 
attitude toward nations that capitulate willingly, as did 
Ibid, p. 684 
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Czechoslovakia. His language of predation suggests that 
such countries deserve such harsh treatment as they receive, 
and any resistance to occupation must be met with savage 
retribution. 
In a conversation recorded by Martin Bormann on May 20, 
1942,^^® Hitler, using language by now familiar, stated that, 
...never in the course of history have 
the Czechs shown themselves capable of 
solving their own political problems, and 
even in their cultural development leant 
heavily on the German culture of the Hapsburg 
state. The right, and indeed, for the German 
Reich the obvious policy is firstly to purge 
the country of all dangerous elements, and 
then to treat the Czechs with friendly 
consideration. ...a certain feeling of 
guilt, coupled with the fear of being 
compelled to evacuate their homes, as the 
result of the transfer of population we are 
undertaking, will persuade them that it will 
be in their interests to emerge as zealous 
co-operators of the Reich. It is this fear 
which besets them that explains why the 
Czechs at the moment--and particularly in the 
war factories--are working to our complete 
satisfaction, doing their most under the 
slogan: "Everything for our Fuhrer, Adolf 
Hitler! 
One week before the attack on Heydrich. 
H. R. Trevor-Roper, Hitler's Secret Conversations. 1941-
1944• trans, by Norman Cameron and R. H. Stevens, (New York: 
Farrar, Straus, and Young, 1953), p. 400. 
104 
In this passage Hitler emphasizes the same ties he had 
drawn between the Czech State and Germany in April of 1939. 
He makes it clear that the Czechs are dependent on German 
guidance to survive. In addition, he makes two points that 
augment permissive values evoked by his language as it 
pertains to the Czechs. First, Hitler declares that the 
Germans must eradicate all "dangerous elements" within Czech 
society in order that the Czechs and the Germans can get on 
with a harmonious relationship. One can only assume that 
Hitler is referring to the Czech resistance efforts that had 
been active^^® since the German occupation in 1939. By 
labeling the resistance as dangerous elements. Hitler 
highlights the threat that they pose to German national 
interest. As such, he is advocating their elimination by 
any means necessary--he is not specific. If the resistance 
is relayed to German citizens and soldiers as being a threat 
to Germany's national interest, especially if intimate 
language is used, the permission for Germans to harm any 
Czechs associated with the resistance is clear. 
It is important to note that the Czech resistance was 
actively encouraged and backed by the British. 
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In addition to his reinforcement of the close ties 
between the Germans and Czechoslovakia, Hitler uses another 
style of language that lends itself to the harsh treatment 
of Czechs--dehumanization. He describes the treatment of 
Czechs whereby they are coerced through guilt^^® and fear to 
relocate and further provide a symbiotic labor force that 
produces war material for the Reich--the political, social, 
and cultural overseer upon which the Czechs are totally 
dependent for sustenance and protection. This is the slave 
race to which Hitler referred in Mein Kampf (see above). 
Another example of the attempt by Hitler to dehumanize 
the Czechs (or certainly to delegitimize their state) is 
found in a speech delivered at Nuremburg on September 12, 
1938 Hitler described the creation of the Czechoslovak state 
as "a short sighted piece of work..." and explained that 
...the statesmen at Versailles brought the 
abnormal structure of Czechoslovakia into 
being. It was possible to violate the 
demands of millions of another nationality 
[Sudeten Germans] only so long as the brother 
nation itself [Germany] was suffering from 
the consequences of general maltreatment by 
We can assume that Hitler means the guilt that Czechs 
feel for their past programs of "national annihilation" 
conducted against the Germans. 
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the world."" 
Hitler's language is clear. The Czech state is an aberrant, 
"abnormal" creation of the Western allies. Czechoslovakia 
is not a traditional entity among the ethnic nations of 
Central Europe, and as such not only does it not belong, but 
it has directly "violated" the lives of ethnic Germans and 
is party to the general "suffering" endured across Europe by 
the German nation. Hitler's language implies that 
Czechoslovakia does not belong as a Central European state, 
and further implies that once that state is gone, German 
suffering will be reduced. By referring to the Czech state 
as "abnormal," Hitler is excluding it from legitimate ethnic 
citizenship in Central Europe. Hitler's language therefore 
permits revenge on two counts. First, he excludes the 
Czechs as a legitimate people of Central Europe (a form of 
dehumanization) and second, connects them directly to the 
suffering of the Sudeten Germans and indirectly to the 
hardships faced by Germans in general. 
Hitler, My World Order, p. 508. 
Through the creation of Czechoslovakia, The Treaty of 
Versailles produced suffering within, and the general 
maltreatment of Germany--alienation, shame, and a target for 
vindictive aggression. 
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Any time a society at war can reduce its enemy to 
subhuman or a generally exclusive status, it eases the 
difficult task of actually killing that enemy. As 
experienced by American infantrymen around the world, this 
phenomenon is universally constant. Japanese soldiers in 
the Pacific campaign during WWII were "Japs." In 
caricatures on propaganda posters the images of Japanese 
soldiers bore no resemblance to real human beings, rather, 
they were rat-faced, yellow, leering, bespeckled figures 
that displayed a more demonic than human quality. To US 
soldiers in the Vietnam War and also to the American public, 
the Viet Cong were sneaky, silent, deadly "gooks" in black 
pajamas who exhibited almost superhuman qualities of stealth 
and murderous potential. The rest of the Vietnamese were 
often referred to as hapless "slopes." During the Persian 
Gulf War and various other US military deployments to the 
Middle East, the people in the engagement areas were 
referred to either as "Ragheads", "Bob" (short for "Bedouin 
Bob"), or "Sand Niggers" (Iraqis.) In all of the examples 
listed, people were trying to psychologically ease for 
The Japanese were also characterized as "monkeys" during 
the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). 
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themselves the enormous burden of killing other people. 
When Hitler painted a portrait of the Czech people as a 
subservient race whose sole purpose it was to provide the 
manpower that drove the German war industry, he made the 
task of killing Czechs, whether they were resistance 
fighters or civilians, easier for those soldiers ordered to 
perform the killing. 
The previous textual excerpts have displayed several 
examples of the means through which the language of Adolf 
Hitler may have provided the citizens and soldiers of 
Germany the historical context and permission needed to 
carry out such atrocious acts as that committed at Lidice. 
Simple, general permission does not, however, provide German 
society with a psychological carte blanche that enables them 
to participate in all sorts of vengeful activities. The 
question of limits must be acceptably addressed. It is one 
thing to achieve retribution for a capital crime by hunting 
down and executing the perpetrator, and another issue 
entirely to massacre innocents to atone for a single death. 
As discussed above, part of the motivation for the degree 
to which the Germans enacted revenge at Lidice was 
political. Soldiers and even civilians in a warring 
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society, however, are not uniformly moved to pathological 
brutality merely by descriptive political motivations based 
upon autobiographies or speeches written or delivered years 
before. There must, therefore, be some permission granted 
to these people regarding brutality as seen in the specific 
and immediate case of Lidice. 
Another example of this permission is found in a 
conversation of Hitler recorded on May 22, 1942: 
In the same way I am of the opinion that one 
should proceed with the utmost severity 
against other contemptible crimes which have 
sprung up under war conditions--for instance, 
theft under cover of a black-out. For, 
except by truly barbaric methods, how can one 
suppress such crimes...as bag-snatching, 
assaults on women, housebreaking when the 
cellar door is left open and so on? For all 
such crimes there must be one penalty alone--
the death penalty, whether the evil-doer is 
seventy or seventeen years of age. 
With this "zero-tolerance" language. Hitler legitimizes the 
control of petty crimes by "barbaric" means. If the penalty 
for these relatively minor infractions is death, the 
destruction of a village as punishment for the assassination 
of a national official might make sense on an escalatory 
scale. By promoting "barbaric" executions as punishment for 
Adolf Hitler, as cited in Trevor-Roper, p. 408. 
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theft and burglary. Hitler is lending implicit permission 
for such acts as perpetrated at Lidice. Indeed, throughout 
such works as Mein Kampf and the documents of Hitler's 
speeches and conversations, there exists an abundance of 
language that calls for severely punitive measures to deal 
with the enemies of the German nation. Hitler's "Final 
Solution" will ever bear testament to the brutality 
envisioned by the leadership of the Third Reich and the 
permission and legitimation of acts of brutality realized 
and actuated by Germans under Nazi rulership. 
Summary 
This section has developed an analysis of several 
documents in which the language of Adolf Hitler provided 
implicit permission for Germans to participate in acts of 
revenge. To reiterate, the focus of this work describes the 
need among nonpathological people for some sort of 
permission to participate in organized and deliberate 
atrocities as witnessed in the case of Lidice. Without some 
sort of implicit permission to instill the values necessary 
to slaughter civilians in an act of state revenge, human 
beings, regardless of the immediate context, be it war or 
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peace, would be unable to make a reasonably confident 
individual decision to participate. 
This analysis relies heavily on the theoretical work of 
Lewis, Retzinger and Scheff regarding shame and vindictive 
aggression. It is evident, however, that shame alone did 
not enable Hitler to project pathological values upon German 
society. Analysis of the discourse of the preceding 
excerpts reveals the many levels at which language both 
revealed and evoked the values and behavior of German 
society under the Nazis. 
Hitler's language provides this permission on several 
levels. In Mein Kampf. Hitler casts his vision of the 
destiny and the direction of the German nation in general 
terms. He speaks of the tragedy of willing capitulation and 
the dangers of insurrection. In other documents. Hitler is 
more specific in addressing the issues facing Germany and 
Czechoslovakia. He ties the German people to the lands of 
Bohemia and Moravia, and vilifies the Western allies and the 
Treaty of Versailles for manufacturing a political Czech 
state which serves to oppress Germans within its borders and 
further threatens the national security of Germany and the 
stability of Europe. Finally, Hitler reduces the Czech 
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state to an unacceptably abnormal entity and its citizens to 
a subhuman (sub-German) status. Through his language, 
Hitler sets the larger stage for the harsh treatment of 
enemies of Germany, then subsequently identifies the Czechs 
as enemies and casts them in the role of an inferior race, a 
race that only exists to serve the German nation. All of 
these perceptions of Czechoslovakia and its inhabitants 
create an atmosphere within which an act of revenge, even if 
it seems excessive, remains permissible within the values of 
German society. 
Further examples of Hitler's permissive language can be 
found elsewhere. One can look at any portion of Mein Kampf 
or any segment of Hitler's speeches and conversations and 
find them replete with the same sorts of permissive language 
indicated above. While it was not likely Hitler's will to 
specifically target the Czechs and set them up for vengeful 
atrocities, and likewise was certainly not the collective 
will of the German people to do so, the extent to which Nazi 
propaganda confronted German society ensured that Germans in 
general and soldiers specifically came into contact with the 
ideas and language outlined above. 
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This chapter has also detailed the second assertion of 
this work--that this permissive, emotional language of 
revenge is a universal, species-wide phenomenon. Several 
instances where American society experienced certain aspects 
of emotional reactions and permissive language serve to show 
that the pattern of pathological behavior was not limited to 
Nazi Germany or other totalitarian systems. The Germans 
were not peculiar in their permissive values related to 
revenge. Even a superficial examination of the records of 
human history reveals widespread instances of state revenge. 
Through comparison of the German experience as defined by 
language and values to certain recent American experiences, 
we can identify the potential universality of the issue. 
chapter V. 
Political Analysis--Conscious and Unconscious Permission 
The language of Adolf Hitler displays clearly the 
values which, as this study claims, provided the necessary 
permission for Germans to both participate in and react 
favorably to acts of pathological revenge as seen at Lidice. 
To claim, however, that the Germans at Lidice and in the 
Sudetenlands acted strictly in response to Hitler's will 
and/or Nazi coercion presents a gross oversimplification. 
The participants at Lidice were not simply automatons. Nor, 
as mentioned in Chapter 1, were they homicidal maniacs. In 
order to understand the nature of permissive values conveyed 
to the Germans involved in the tragedy at Lidice it is 
useful to consult works of political theory in order to form 
a more complete understanding of the mutually-affective 
relationship between Hitler and the German Nation. 
With few, if any, exceptions, the political nature of 
the Third Reich and its leader have provided a subject for 
more political analyses than any other comparable 
phenomenon. Since the 1930's, political scientists have 
speculated about the meaning of the Nazis' rise to power and 
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wrestled with analyses of the consequences. Perhaps no 
political system, and certainly no individual have had a 
more profound effect on our lives today as the Third Reich 
and Adolf Hitler. These analyses all seek to shed some 
light on one of the more troubling issues of Nazi Germany--
the enthusiasm with which the German population embraced the 
ideas of Hitler and the Nazis, and the profound consequences 
that followed. 
Historians tend to be accurate, though somewhat 
limited, in their analysis of the positive reaction of the 
Germans to the Nazis. Cast in the context of the crushing 
financial burden of the Versailles Diktat. the impotence of 
the Weimar government, and the devastation of the depression 
of 1929, it is easy to imagine the total desperation of the 
Germans. A desperation which allowed Hitler to deliver an 
attractive, messianic party-line to the German nation. In a 
sweeping description of the values shared by Nazis and 
Germans rising from the historical context of the inter-war 
years, Emil Ludwig portrays the attitudes of "average" 
Germans in a 1930 New York Times article: 
...Versailles did great damage. Even 
[opponents to Nazi extremism] felt that we 
were defrauded--we, indeed, most of all 
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because we believed in a new Europe. 
...under the pressure of [war reparations] 
German prejudices are being strengthened 
rather than weakened, and a foresighted 
policy would favor a revision of the 
[Versailles] treaty, for it is in this that 
German advocates of revenge still find their 
strongest arguments . 
Ludwig describes the contextual seedbed for the Nazi 
success. While he does not yet recognize or ac>cnowledge (at 
Emil Ludwig, "The Average German Speaks," December 7, 
1930, from Nazis and Fascists in Europe. 1918-1945. John 
Weiss, ed., (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969). reprint from 
the New York Times Magazine. December 7, 1930, (New York: 
New York Times Co., 1930), pp. 76, 82. My italics. Ludwig 
also identifies the connection in values regarding Poland 
and Czechoslovakia. As the products of the Versailles 
treaty, they were targets of collective envy-turned-loathing 
through the vengeful rhetoric of the Nazis, See ibid, p. 78. 
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least in print) the nature of the Nazi movement, he does 
identify the general climate in which Germans were initially 
receptive to Hitler's rhetoric of reclaiming German 
greatness. 
The Germans of the Weimar era were primed for the 
Nazis' language detailing an end to suffering and the 
emergence of a German phoenix from the ashes of 1918. 
Examining the peculiar nature of the inter-war years, the 
reasons for German enthusiasm toward the messages of the 
Nazis become clear. Less clear in the efforts of 
historians, however, is the nature of the relationship 
between the German people and the Nazis. While the 
historical context of the Weimar era effectively sets the 
stage for German acceptance of Hitler, history alone cannot 
provide a complete and detailed portrait of the relationship 
between Hitler and the Germans--the relationship from which 
springs the permission necessary for pathological tragedies 
like Lidice. 
One very dominant and effective genre of political 
analysis regarding the positive relationship between the 
Germans and Hitler is found in the study of totalitarianism. 
Hannah Arendt, in her 1951 work entitled. The Origins of 
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Totalitarianism, describes totalitarian movements as 
mass organizations of atomized, isolated 
individuals. Compared with other parties and 
movements, their most conspicuous external 
characteristic is their demand for total, 
unrestricted, unconditional, and unalterable 
loyalty of the individual member. 
Arendt makes a clear case for the study of individual values 
and the effect of totalitarianism on the values and 
subsequent behavior of individuals within a totalitarian 
regime. Her language highlights the role of the individual 
as a participant in, rather than simply a subject of the 
totalitarian movement. 
As totalitarianism demands the positive participation 
of the individuals comprising society, totalitarian elites 
must somehow secure this complete loyalty within the 
societies they intend to rule. Arendt details this point 
when she writes: 
Total loyalty is possible only when fidelity 
is emptied of all concrete content, from 
which changes of mind might naturally arise. 
The totalitarian movements... have done their 
utmost to get rid of the party programs which 
specified concrete content and which they 
inherited from earlier, nontotalitarian 
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism. (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1951), p. 316. 
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stages of development."® 
Here Arendt speaks of some level of mind control. For 
totalitarianism to succeed, the leadership must create a new 
format for political loyalty. This new, revolutionary 
loyalty must contain exclusively the values stemming 
directly from the totalitarian elite. Unlike many other 
types of regimes, totalitarian leaders must resist the urge 
to build upon past values and ideologies which formed the 
previous "nontotalitarian" phases of their society. 
In this portion of her analysis Arendt runs into a 
problem with Hitler and the rise of the Nazis, for Hitler 
certainly evoked values, perceptions, desires, and 
traditions from pre-Nazi Germany to attain and maintain the 
Nazi totalitarian state. For Hitler to have enjoyed "total 
loyalty" as described by Arendt, he would have had to employ 
not only rhetoric, but also instituted new cultural norms 
free from the influence of all previous German culture, 
society, and political systems. In theory, then, 
totalitarianism demands a complete social revolution that 
frees society from all previous "nontotalitarian" values. 
Ibid, p. 317. 
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This, quite simply, did not occur in Germany. 
Arendt addresses this conflict between the theoretical 
demands and goals of a model totalitarian system and those 
manifested in the Fascist movements in Europe: 
The true goal of Fascism was only to seize 
power and establish the Fascist 'elite' as 
uncontested ruler over the country; 
totalitarianism's aspiration to total 
domination eliminates the distance between 
the ruler and the ruled population. ...the 
ultimate goal of the dictatorial party, ie., 
the seizure of power and the occupation of 
the state machinery, is for the totalitarian 
movement only a transitory stage in its total 
expansion into the population. . . . 
Arendt mentions two crucial themes of totalitarianism as 
seen in Europe in the 1930's and 40's: The intimacy of the 
relationship between the "ruler and the ruled" (Hitler and 
the Germans), and the goal of total domination of the 
infrastructure of society. If we can believe that the only 
goal of the Nazis was to establish their "elite" as the sole 
motivating force in German society, and that this control 
produced an intimate relationship between the elite and the 
rest of Germany, then it is easy to develop theories 
regarding the ease and efficiency with which Nazi values 
Ibid, p. 318. 
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came to define and drive German social behavior. 
Acceptable behavioral standards in totalitarian 
societies can therefore be related to a collective response 
to the language of leaders and the context within which that 
language is perceived and interpreted. Two works that 
reflect the connection between national decision-makers and 
national behavior are Foreign Policy Decision-Making, by 
Richard Snyder, H. Bruck, and Burton Spine, and 
Psychological Aspects of International Conflict, by Ross 
Stanger."® Both books aim to describe the behavior of 
nation-states as defined and driven by decision-making. 
Their primary goal is to connect the actions of modern 
states to the behavior of specific individuals. Stanger, 
especially, examines this relationship in a psychological 
context. The authors examine the decision-making process on 
many levels (such as institutions, groups, and 
organizations) but invariably return to highlight the strong 
influence that the decisions of individual leaders have in 
Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Spine, Foreign 
Policy Decision-Making (New York: The Free Press, 1958). 
Ross Stanger, Psychological Aspects of International 
Conflict (Belmont: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., 1967). 
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affecting the behavior of the nation-state in which they 
serve some authoritative function. While the authors 
examine the potential for a mutually-affective relationship 
between individuals, organizations, and society at large, it 
is important to acknowledge the degree to which absolute 
authority (as wielded by Hitler) increases the affective 
potential of an individual leader's decisions upon national 
behavior. In other words, the more absolute the power of 
the elite, the more a single individual's decisions, or 
rhetoric, can potentially affect the behavior of society. 
Harold Lasswell lends additional weight to the 
completeness with which Nazi values dominated German 
society. In the introduction to his 1965 compilation. World 
Revolutionary Elites, he asserts that totalitarian elites 
are completely self-defined. In accordance to Arendt ' s 
analysis of totalitarianism, this assertion agrees with the 
idea that leaders such as Hitler had to somehow mold public 
opinion with regard to past, nontotalitarian traditions in 
German culture. Hitler's solution to the problem of 
Harold Lasswell, and Daniel Lerner, eds. , World 
Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological 
Movements (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 5. 
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pretotalitarian values took the form of intense ideological 
manipulation through propaganda and censorship. 
In a New York Times article of January, 1939, Junius B. 
Wood describes the manner in which the Nazis built a 
consensus through censorship and manipulation. Writing from 
Berlin, Wood tells us that "the newspapers are informed 
[daily] on government policy. They receive and follow 
instructions on what to print about it. ...they get the 
report of the official news agency... whose version must be 
used."^^^ Wood further describes the voracity with which the 
German population consumes the reports of the government-
controlled media. The combination of media control on the 
part of the Nazis and the avaricious nature of the German 
readership is one example of the manner in which Hitler 
approached the problem of pre-Nazi values and traditions in 
German society. 
This movement to control the minds of Germany was led 
by Hitler's propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels. In 1937, 
Junius B. Wood, "Channeling News for the Nazis," from 
Nazis and Fascists in Europe. 1918-1945 John Weiss, ed., 
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969) reprint from the New York 
Times Magazine January 15, 193 9 (New York: New York Times 
Co., 1939), p. 130. 
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Albion Ross described the efforts of Goebbels in the New 
York Times, writing that "Thought control pervades the 
atmosphere. It stares out of every printed page. It 
accounts for the music that you hear on the radio. It crops 
out in every conversation. It is like the fixed idea that 
torments the Neurotic. Even while you are resisting, the 
propagandists are exercising their influence on you."^^^ 
Ross describes the detail and enthusiasm with which Goebbels 
approached his work as propaganda minister. While 
skepticism and resistance are evident among Germans at the 
time of this article, Ross describes the Nazi efforts at 
mind control as a constant, determined process. In 
predicting the eventual success of Goebbels's efforts, Ross 
quotes him: "'The nature of propaganda is quite unlimited. 
It adapts itself to the person for whom it is intended 
The Nazi efforts at mind control did not begin and end 
with the media. German culture, as most cultures, was and 
is steeped in tradition. As it concerns the effectiveness 
Albion Ross, "Goebbels Edits the Popular mind in 
Germany," Feb 12, 1937, New York Times Magazine as cited in 
Ludwig, pp. 137-38. [My italics] 
Ibid, p. 143. 
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of totalitarianism, these traditions are pretotalitarian and 
therefore problematic. Elizabeth Wiskemann, writing in the 
New York Times in 1934, describes the efforts of the Nazis 
to come to terms with the cultural problem: 
...Herr Hitler and his followers [are 
attempting] not only a political and economic 
but also a cultural revolution. The 
sentimentalism, internationalism and 
individualism which had run riot before the 
World War [WWI] were to give way to qualities 
more suitable to the nature of an 
authoritarian and nationalistic state. The 
'pure Aryan' was to have his innings in the 
arts as well as in business and politics. 
While Wiskemann's claims of a total cultural revolution, 
especially regarding sentimentalism, do not completely 
stand-up to historical scrutiny, she does illuminate 
important aspects of the manner in which the Nazis coalesced 
their control of German values. The Nazis, while unable to 
affect a total social revolution in Germany, did manage, 
through the relentless efforts of their Propaganda Ministry 
and the intimacy of the relationship between the elites and 
the populace, to augment traditional German social values 
with the values of the Nazi elite. They created a new Aryan 
Elizabeth Wiskemann, "On the Cultural Front the Nazis 
Drive," May 27, 1934, New York Times Magazine, as cited in 
Ludwig, p. 16 0. 
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mythology which, rather than obliterating the past of 
Germandom, altered contemporary perceptions of Germandom and 
the manner in which Germans viewed the peculiarities of 
their collective past. 
Evidence of their success is easily found in news 
reports of the time. On March 29, 1936, Otto Tolischus 
wrote an account of Hitler's success at consensus-building 
in the New York Times: 
The German Nation goes to the polls today to 
endorse, with practical unanimity 
foreordained, Adolf Hitler and all his works 
and...to elect a new Reichstag chosen by him 
to shout approval whenever such demonstration 
is deemed advisable. 
Taken at face value...the spectacle of a 
great people being at last welded into a 
national unity through the struggle for 
resurgence...is not without grandeur. ...the 
majority is bound to be so overwhelming that 
Hitler will still be able to repeat... the 
taunting challenge he flung out at foreign 
statesmen during the election campaign: 
'Behind me stands the whole German 
people. Who stands behind you? ' 
Tolischus goes on to describe this achievement as the 
"result of the skillful wielding of the weapons of 
Otto D. Tolischus, "Spurring a Nation: The Nazi Way," 
March 29, 1936, New York Times Magazine as cited in Ludwig, 
p. 144. [emphasis added] 
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propaganda backed by the persuasive power of force. 
As evident from the preceding analysis of 
totalitarianism, a convincing case can be made tying the 
values of German society during World War II to the 
manipulations of the Nazi elite. There is no shortage of 
thoughtful, interpretive analyses regarding the phenomenon 
of totalitarianism nor of evidence to bolster these 
theories. Within the confines totalitarian values the case 
for permissive language regarding revenge is clear. The 
intimate tie between the Nazi elite and the population 
enabled the Nazis to plant and then nurture such permissive 
values necessary in order to ensure compliance from the 
Germans, even to the extent of participation in and/or 
approval of a tragedy such as Lidice. 
It is important to understand the manner in which the 
Nazi leadership acquired and maintained almost complete 
control of the perception of the German nation, and in doing 
so were able to effect behavior and values concurrent with 
that of the Nazi regime. This approach to understanding the 
behavior of the German people in World War II, though 
Ibid, p. 145. 
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convincing, is problematic with regard to this work. While 
the phenomenon of pathological revenge can make sense both 
under the desperate conditions described by historical 
analyses and in theories of totalitarianism, these 
approaches to the problem fail to illuminate the universal 
nature of the phenomenon. If institutionalized revenge 
occurred only in countries undergoing some desperate plight 
induced by a foreign nation, or in countries governed by 
totalitarian regimes, this analysis of the nature of 
totalitarianism would provide sufficient explanation for 
revenge in war as pathological behavior. Examination of the 
human experience does not, however, back this claim. While 
it is easy to say that totalitarian regimes in general, and 
the experience of Germany in particular, enhance the 
probability of tragedies such as Lidice, revenge has, and 
continues to occur around the world within many different 
political and historical climates. 
In order to analyze revenge as a more universal 
phenomenon, therefore, it is necessary to examine political 
theories that provide a more comprehensive view of human 
nature and political behavior. As a large part of this work 
uses psychological and sociological theories to examine 
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permissive language, it makes sense to consult psychological 
approaches to political theory. Herbert Kelman provides a 
solid foundation upon which to build more detailed ideas 
regarding psychology, politics, aggression, and revenge. In 
his essay entitled, "Social-Psychological Approaches to the 
Study of International Relations," Kelman writes: 
One cannot expect [due to the complexity 
of human societies] that the behavior of 
a nation will be a direct reflection of 
the motives of its citizens or even of 
its leaders. ... Leaders may engage in 
aggressive behavior for strategic 
reasons... and the population at large 
for reasons of social conformity. 
Kelman illuminates two ideas regarding aggressive political 
behavior (war) which apply directly to this study of Lidice. 
The decision of national leaders to engage in aggressive 
behavior is thoughtful and deliberate. Hitler ordered the 
annihilation of Lidice in order to accomplish specific 
political and strategic aims: He provided retributive 
satisfaction for the German nation and made a strong display 
to the Czech resistance of the consequences of rebellion. 
Herbert C. Kelman, "Social-Psychological Approaches to 
the Study of International Relations: Definition of Scope," 
from International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis 
H. Kelman, ed., (New York: Holt Rinehart, and Winston, 
1965), p. 6. 
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The people involved in carrying-out the act were, according 
to Kelman, exhibiting behavior that enhances social 
conformity. 
Like Kelman, Irving Janis discusses the conformist 
dimension of human behavior in his 1982 work entitled 
Groupthink. While Janis ' s primary intention is to display 
the means by which "groupthink" can lead to misguided policy 
decisions, his definition of a psychological phenomenon can 
shed light on the manner in which a society might arrive at 
mass, concerted conclusions regarding permission and 
acceptable behavior. 
As defined by Janis, "groupthink" is, "an easy way to 
refer to a mode of thinking that people engage in when they 
are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the 
members' striving for unanimity override their motivation to 
realistically appraise alternative courses of action. 
This definition can be altered somewhat and applied to 
larger society in general. 
Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological studies of 
Policy Decisions and Fiascoes 2nd edition, (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1982). 
Ibid, p. 9. 
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Any successful society depends on some amount of 
uniformity and cohesion for survival. As such, they may 
strive to construct a "unanimity" of values that regulate 
behavior. A society that searches for this unanimity within 
the stressful context of war might collectively be extremely 
receptive and positively responsive to the suggestions and 
directives of their leadership. Americans witnessed this 
phenomenon during the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Although 
there had been a very significant protest against initiating 
an armed conflict with Iraq, once American forces had been 
committed to combat, Americans, both supporters and 
opponents of the war, responded positively to the language 
of the leadership who demanded that Americans "support the 
troops." German civilians and soldiers living in the context 
of a war in which Germany faced the threat of a powerful 
coalition of enemies undoubtedly formed a societal "in-
group" and as such were susceptible to a larger form of 
society-wide "groupthink" as the language of their 
leadership developed and affected their behavioral values. 
These analyses of the drive toward conformity in human 
society suggest an independent coalition-building tendency 
in human nature. Examined more closely with the help of the 
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more specific psychoanalytical theories outlined in Chapter 
2, this phenomenon of social conformity reflects the 
society-wide manifestation of the shame/aggression cycle 
described by Lewis, Retzinger, and Scheff. Both Kelman and 
Janis relate unified social behavior to a perceived threat. 
As shown in Chapter II, a threat to an individual arouses 
emotions that indicate shame which, if unacknowledged, can 
lead to aggressive behavior--revenge. Keeping this 
psychological cycle in mind, aggressive social conformity in 
the face of a larger threat (from another nation, for 
example) that is channeled into violent behavior (war) 
represents a society-wide shame/aggression cycle. 
This theory of unified social aggression, on the 
surface, implies that permission for aggressive behavior is 
not necessary for individuals to participate in or condone 
such acts. For this to hold true, theorists and historians 
must present a convincing body of evidence which clearly 
displays a trend of society-wide psychopathology that comes 
and goes with threats to that nation. As mentioned in 
Chapter II, and again in the quote from Kelman above, the 
See Bok. 
133 
nature of social behavior and international relations is far 
too complex an issue to be satisfactorily explained by a 
singular theory. As stated in Chapter 1, this work is an 
effort to discover permission for pathological social 
behavior. As the internal aspects of international conflict 
and social behavior are nearly infinitely complex, the 
search for a singular type of permission will encounter the 
same problems as other monocausal analyses. This study, 
then, must expand and detail the idea of permission to 
present an adequate approach to social pathology. 
One aspect of social behavioral analyses alluded to 
above that must be taken into consideration is that of 
context. Harold Lasswell outlines the contextual issues of 
international relations in his essay, "The Climate of 
International Action." Lasswell's general intent is an 
analysis of the affectiveness of contextual "climate" as 
indicated by the "mood" of a society. By climate, Lasswell 
refers to "the degree of intensity, or stress toward action 
and... the value orientation of the [social majority] . By 
this, Lasswell constructs an idea of climate which includes 
Harold Lasswell, "The Climate of International Action," from 
Kelman, p. 341. 
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all factors acting upon the general population (ie., the 
economy, international situation, leadership) and the 
subsequent "mood"^^^, or qualities of social values generated 
among society as a result of these factors. 
Having defined his terms, Lasswell continues to develop 
a theory of collective social moods, the intensity of which 
is directly reflective of the "crisis level experienced 
within a given society. This collective mood is evidenced 
by society-wide impulses that affect and are affected by 
individual moods. Regarding individual and collective 
behavior, Lasswell writes: 
...collective as well as individual moods are 
important components of the international 
political process. Every initiative to act 
has some impact... upon the flow of mood; it 
is at the phase of mood formation that 
conflicting, facilitating, and nonrelevant 
initiatives are consolidated and focused 
toward narrower objectives. . . . 
For Lasswell, the terms "climate" and "mood" are nearly synonymo 
"We equate the notion of climate in international affairs with the 
conception of mood, recognizing that mood can be distinguished by 
degrees of intensity and by general value orientation.", ibid. [My 
italics] 
Ibid, p. 344. 
Ibid, p. 349. 
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Lasswell describes the collective mood as the point 
where "all tributary initiatives and messages meet and fuse 
in a dominant channel leading toward activities that conform 
to or modify the previous requirements and policy. The 
importance of mood as defined and directed by the contextual 
climate within which a society operates is key to 
understanding international behavior. 
The difficult task, according to Lasswell, is 
identifying the "value orientation" of a society's mood. 
For political analysis to be truly effective, theories must 
provide some measure by which international behavior can be 
identified and predicted. For Lasswell, the language and 
rhetoric of national leaders provides the window through 
which analysts can determine the value orientation of a 
society. Hitler's speech before the Reichstag^^^ therefore 
not only displays Hitler's individual intentions regarding 
Central Europe, it also reflects the general value 
orientation of German society. 
Ibid, p. 352. 
Ibid, pp. 342-343. 
See chapter IV. 
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Quite similar to Lasswell's discussion, Daniel Katz 
continues the analysis of collective values and moods in 
social behavior in his essay, "Nationalism and Strategies of 
International Conflict Resolution. Katz maintains that 
by studying the nature of individuals analysts can draw 
conclusions regarding the behavior of society in general. 
As his study focuses on contemporary issues, Katz points to 
the nature of modern nation states and the ideology of 
nationalism as the psychological cement that transfers 
individual "moods" to collective moods, and vice versa. 
Katz identifies four main forces which contribute to 
the arousal of nationalism. The first force is found in 
emotional and behavioral conditioning to national symbols. 
Flags, pledges of loyalty, national anthems and slogans are 
all emotionally-charged images that affect the behavior of 
individuals.^®" Katz maintains that this conditioning 
See also Dean Pruitt' s essay, "Definition of the 
Situation as a Determinant of International Action," cited 
in Kelman, p. 391. Like Katz, Pruitt traces the behavior of 
the modern state to the behavior of individual citizens. 
Daniel Katz, "Nationalism and Strategies of International 
Conflict Resolution," cited in Kelman, pp. 358-360. 
Ibid, p. 365. 
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affects behavior due to the "perceived unanimity of others 
following a supposed patriotic course of action. 
Compliance with national behavioral norms occurs largely due 
to conditioning that begins at an early age. 
The formation of a "self concept as inclusive of 
national identity is the second force of aroused 
nationalism. According to Katz, the identity of "self" 
includes a unique self as well as a self who is part of a 
larger national conglomeration.^®^ As individuals, we all 
have a perception of ourselves that distinguishes us from 
all others; as Americans, we also have a sense of self as a 
part of a larger collective, national identity. Individuals 
among all the modern nation states have the same dualistic 
identity which, as detailed by Katz above, serves to 
transfer individual emotions and behavior to national 
behavior. 
The third force which Katz identifies is the idea that 
each individual has an instrumental role to play in 
maintaining the national structure and traditions of their 
Ibid. 
Ibid, p. 366. 
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society. This idea is based on the assumption that 
individuals hold close ties to their way of life and the 
structural integrity of the nation, and thus participate in 
the pursuit of collective progress. Inverting this idea, 
it becomes clear (as most of the theorists cited in this 
work have proposed) that threats to the integrity of the 
nation will elicit emotional responses among the members of 
that society. These individual emotions, according to Katz, 
will eventually transfer to collective national behavior. 
Fourth among the forces that affect the arousal of 
nationalism are compensatory feelings, or the projection of 
self-image upon others based on individual attempts to solve 
personal conflicts and insecurities.^®^ This force is 
instrumental in establishing ties between individual and 
national behavior. When the international climate within 
which the national mood affects an emotional response among 
individuals, the source and nature of the response are 
unilaterally experienced by all members of that society. To 
use the example of the Germans and Lidice, the emotional 
Ibid, pp. 367-369. 
Ibid, pp. 367-369. 
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reaction to Heydrich's assassination was experienced by all 
members of German society exposed to the event through 
either media reports or more direct contact. While the 
degree or intensity of these emotions invariably differed 
among individuals, there still existed, according to Katz's 
theory, a transference of emotion and desires among 
individuals in German society (both the Nazi elite and the 
general population) that eventually manifested itself in 
political action, a part of which was the destruction of 
Lidice. 
The messages of the above-mentioned theorists, while 
each contains some unique characteristics, are all also 
remarkably similar. All maintain some measure of connection 
between individual emotions and national behavior. These 
theorists all claim that analysis of individual emotions can 
project the quality of social moods and intentions and 
further enable prediction of national behavior. Differences 
arise among the theories concerning the precise relationship 
between the general population and the elite regarding the 
role of each in affecting collective social values. Whether 
this connection is a result of, or reflected in the language 
of the elite is, ultimately unimportant. The major 
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contribution of these theories to this work are the emphasis 
that each theorist places on the strong role that emotions 
and feelings play in the nature of national behavior. 
Summary: "Conscious" and "Unconscious" Permission 
Examining the psychological theories outlined above 
encourages a further theoretical analysis of the issues 
surrounding the phenomenon of revenge and permission. As 
stated Chapter 1, the primary goal of this work is to 
illuminate the manner in which social values are articulated 
and manifested in societies, and the manners in which they 
provide adequate permission for otherwise normal individuals 
to engage in pathological behavior. Looking at the nature 
of certain psychological theories one can discern several 
different ideas regarding individual and social emotions, 
values, and conduct. 
The theories of totalitarianism focus on the ability of 
an individual leader to dictate and manipulate national 
values and behavior of others. This social control is the 
product of total devotion or compliance on the part of the 
general population. To reinforce Arendt's theory, this 
loyalty must be complete in order for the totalitarian to 
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maintain control. Hitler acquired and maintained this total 
devotion through censorship and propaganda. By controlling 
the perceptions of German society. Hitler was able to 
control social behavior arising from a collective 
consciousness among the Germans. Through his language, 
Hitler controlled the perceptions and emotions of the German 
population. Applied to Lidice, Hitler articulated 
conscious, direct permission both for German soldiers to 
participate in the destruction of the town and for the 
German people to approve of the act, thus enabling 
collective pathological behavior among nonpathological 
individuals. 
This idea of "conscious" permission is a key factor in 
understanding the behavior of the Germans regarding Lidice, 
but it provides far too limited a view to apply analysis to 
nontotalitarian social organizations. While analysis of 
Hitler's language is useful in examining the extent to which 
Nazi values permeated German society, it discounts entirely 
the role of independent individual emotions and values in 
the formation of national attitudes. In examining more 
general works of behavioral political theory, it becomes 
clear that individual emotions contribute to a collective 
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will (mood) manifested in national behavior (policy). The 
key to understanding this national behavior with regard to 
permission is the affective connection between individual 
emotions and national policy. A people united by a common 
ideology (nationalism) are conditioned to have similar 
emotional reactions to national images and traditions.^®® 
When international events affect these national images, the 
emotional reactions of members of that nation are common in 
quality if not intensity. It is from this common, 
collective emotional reaction that the idea of unconscious 
permission emerges. In the case of the Germans and Lidice, 
the assassination of Heydrich represented a distinct threat 
to a dominant image of the Nazi state. On an individual 
level, Germans felt threatened by some degree of alienation. 
As detailed in Chapter II, this alienation represents the 
initial emotion in the shame/aggression cycle developed by 
Lewis, Retzinger, and Scheff. Each German, to some degree 
of intensity, experienced the cycle of shame, the most 
common psychological outcome of which is aggressive behavior 
manifested in the search for a remedy to shameful emotions 
See Katz above. 
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through revenge. This shared emotional process provides 
"unconscious" permission--the second necessary aspect of 
permission for pathological behavior. 
The tragedy of revenge during wartime is a problem 
which can be understood, in part, through an examination of 
emotions and feelings. Should policy makers adopt a more 
sensitive approach to the problems of emotions and revenge 
in war, their efforts to contain the potential for revenge 
would entail restricting the issuance of "conscious" 
permission for such acts. These efforts of decision makers 
regarding prevention of wartime revenge can, regardless of 
precautions mandated by policy, be easily compromised by 
military leaders, whose charges hold the will and the means 
by which wartime revenge is ultimately carried-out. This 
study attempts not only to illuminate the need for more 
sensitivity regarding feelings and emotions in international 
policy decisions, but also the need for a more enlightened 
approach to military leadership in this new era of 
international peacekeeping. 
Hitler, on December 22, 1941, proclaimed himself 
supreme commander of the German military. By doing so, he 
projected his values onto the ranks of the German armed 
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forces. While German soldiers certainly did not adopt 
Hitler's values and opinions wholesale, there can be no 
doubt that Hitler's rhetoric, taken in the context of 
partisan armed conflct (a conflict atmosphere made even more 
bitter by Heydrich's assassination) enabled those soldiers 
to be more receptive to the more pathological attitudes of 
their Commander-in-Chief. John Keegan discusses the way in 
which Hitler established and utilized his "Theatre of 
Leadership."^" In the following analysis of Hitler's 
command style, Keegan describes the means by which Hitler's 
emotional and evocative language affected the behavior of 
German soldiers--especially those soldiers of the junior 
ranks, who would have to make the individual ethical 
decision to carry-out the orders of their superiors. 
Shameless though Hitler's manipulation 
of the heroic value system was, its 
effectiveness was borne out by results. 
The German army of 1945, unlike that of 
1918, fought unquestioningly to the end. 
...the run of the mill officers and 
common soldiers gave him their total 
loyalty and surrendered at the last only 
when ordered to do so. 
John Keegan, The Mask of Command (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1987), p. 304. 
Ibid, p. 307. 
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Just as Hitler used his rhetoric to affect the climate 
of German politics, he similarly infused his values among 
the ranks of the German military. The relationship between 
the attitudes of military leaders and the behavior of their 
troops is a very sophisticated matter, and one which is not 
likely to be conclusively detailed through any amount of 
psychological and political theory. Themeans by which 
leaders direct the behavior of their forces consists of, 
among other factors, an intangible quality that defies 
concise definition, yet it can never be denied that such a 
quality exists. From antiquity to the present, theorists 
have wrestled with this fundamental issue of the 
relationship between leaders and their soldiers: How do 
commanders come to effectively control of their soldiers? 
Clausewitz described this relationship as the "military 
virtue of an army."^®® 
This is distinguished from mere bravery, 
and still more from enthusiasm for the 
business of war. The first is certainly 
a necessary constituent part of it, but 
in the same way as bravery, which is a 
natural gift in some men, may arise in a 
Carl von Clausewitz, On War Anatol Rapoport, ed. , (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1982), p. 254. 
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soldier as a part of an Army from habit 
and custom, so with him it must also 
have a different direction.... It must 
lose that impulse to unbridled activity 
and exercise of force which is its 
characteristic in the individual 
[bravery and enthusiasm], and submit 
itself to demands of a higher kind, to 
obedience, order, rule, and method. 
Enthusiasm for the profession gives life 
and greater fire to the military virtue 
of an army, but does not necessarily 
constitute a part of it.^®® 
The military virtue of an army thus describes a departure 
from personal heroics by individual soldiers, to a 
collective behavior, based on "habit and custom," that is 
shaped and utilized by commanders--"obediance, order, rule, 
and method." Anyone who has observed the military closely 
can appreciate this "invisible hand" of leadership produced 
by the relationship between a group of soldiers 
(specifically their collective behavior) and their leaders. 
Soldiers follow orders for many reasons. Military 
indoctrination impresses upon soldiers the importance of 
following orders, for if a soldier fails to follow orders, 
the consequences could bring personal (and, in theory, 
political) devastation. Noncompliance in an individual 
Ibid. 
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soldier could lead to his own death as well as that of other 
soldiers, thus putting the outcome of the mission, the 
battle, and perhaps even the war in doubt. Furthermore, the 
fear of punishment can coerce soldiers to act. Aside from 
indoctrination and fear, there is another aspect of the 
relationship between leaders and subordinates. Soldiers can 
mold their behavior to reflect and react to the intentions 
of their leaders in a response to a belief (or at least a 
sincere hope) that their leader truly makes decisions, 
especially in combat, that will provide for the good of the 
unit and realize the best potential for keeping the soldiers 
alive. As much as this belief is a powerful motivating 
force within military organizations, so can it provide 
motivation in a larger social scale in wartime. 
As these motivating forces of leadership applied to the 
behavior of nations during World War II, every person in 
continental Europe, whether they were an actual combatant or 
not, could at least remain somewhat unsurprised should they 
be directly affected by the fighting. The Germans, due to 
the geographic centrality of their position were especially 
sensitive to the notions of total war and "a nation in 
arms." The effectiveness of Hitler's rhetoric in 
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influencing, directly and indirectly the behavioral values 
of the German people is evident in the context of the war 
and upon reflection on the theories outlined above. While 
Hitler's language was not the single force driving German 
values and behavior, German society was nonetheless heavily 
influenced by the words of a charismatic and trusted leader. 
Applied to the role of today's military forces in 
international peacekeeping operations, the need to contain 
the potential for pathological behavior is paramount. The 
conduct of soldiers, like any other human beings, is 
affected by the language of their superiors. Through 
language, leaders can elicit emotional responses among their 
soldiers that will provide collective "unconscious" 
permission for pathological behavior via the emotional cycle 
connected with shame. Leaders, by virtue of their 
authoritative position, can further issue orders that 
provide soldiers with the "conscious" permission necessary 
for pathological retribution. Efforts must be taken at all 
stages of the implementation of international peacekeeping 
policy--from the formation of policy in negotiations to the 
execution of policy at the hands of military organizations--
to contain the dissemination of permissive values that 
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increase the potential for pathological behavior and the 
tragedies arising from such behavior. 
chapter VI 
Revenge now and in the Future 
In February, 1991, the 1st Marine Division spearheaded 
the offensive to liberate Kuwait City from occupying Iraqi 
forces during the ground phase of the Persian Gulf War. 
Once the city had been secured by forces of the Allied 
Coalition, units of the 1st Marine Division were ordered to 
withdraw to the rear, charged with war crimes. It was 
alleged that the Marines had shot surrendering Iraqis 
(rather than take them prisoner) and desecrated the bodies 
of the dead. An interview with a former Marine who 
participated in the offensive (and who requested anonymity) 
revealed that he and his comrades had "killed every Iraqi 
[they] saw." He said that it did not matter whether the 
Iraqi soldiers were fighting or fleeing, the Marines engaged 
all with equally deadly force. When asked why they had done 
this, the Marine responded that they had been told stories 
detailing the gruesome brutality of the Iraqis in Kuwait 
just prior to the onset of the ground war. In addition, the 
operations order given to these Marines included the 
1 Rn 
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directive to "sweep and clear with extreme prejudice. 
It is clear that, at some level, the leadership of the 
1st Marine Division provided the Marines in their command 
with both unconscious and conscious permission to engage in 
pathological behavior. By telling, or at least encouraging 
stories describing the brutality of the Iraqis in their 
treatment of the Kuwaitis, the Marine leaders potentially 
initiated psychological shame/rage cycles that provided the 
Marines with the unconscious permission for pathological 
behavior. Further, by using the language, "sweep and clear 
with extreme prejudice," the leaders provided the Marines 
with conscious permission to engage and kill the Iraqis 
without set limits of engagement. Without meaning to have 
done so, the Officers of the 1st Marine Division set the 
stage within which pathological behavior potentially 
overrode restraint and led to an avoidable tragedy. 
While the intent of the Marine Officers during the 
Anonymous, interviewed by author, transcript, Missoula, 
Montana, 5 December 1995. 
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Persian Gulf War was undoubtedly not sinister, other, 
deliberate acts of revenge continue to hamper global 
peacekeeping efforts today. Recently, at the trial of 
accused Serbian war criminal, Dusan Tradic, testimony of 
residents of the Bosnian town of Brcko accompanied amateur 
video footage of the 1992 "cleansing" of that town. The 
video records images of a small child hanging from the 
minaret of a mosque. Another scene shows refrigerated 
trucks full of bodies pull up to a meat rendering plant and 
unload the corpses into large vats. Throughout the tape are 
panoramic shots of the village with bodies lining the 
roads. 
The Dayton Peace Accord, seen initially as a diplomatic 
triumph in the efforts to restore peace in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, is in jeopardy due to the experiences such as 
the massacre at Brcko. The peace accord calls for the 
reintegration of the different ethnic populations of the 
region. The vengeful backlash from the experience of the 
war is evident today. Across Bosnia, the ethnic populations 
still enforce segregation with threats of violence. Efforts 
Scott Peterson, "Justice for Bosnia May Rest on Mixed 
Memories," The Christian Science Monitor 10 May 1996, p. 1. 
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by UN peacekeepers to actively reintegrate Bosnia are met 
with equally active resistance. Recently, a Muslim 
addressing a crowd intent on stopping Serbs from returning 
to their neighborhoods said, "I'm from a village where [the 
Serbs] destroyed everything, where they killed many 
civilians. The people who did the crimes left, and now they 
want to come back. It is not allowed.""^ 
Clearly, the Serbs wanting to return to their 
neighborhoods are not necessarily guilty of war crimes; they 
are, however guilty by ethnic association in the eyes of the 
Muslims. The experience of four years of bitter warfare and 
partisanship has given all the ethnic groups of Bosnia 
unconscious permission to enact revenge against their former 
enemies. As leaders such as Serbs Radovan Karadzic and 
military chief Ratko Mladic continue to use vindictive 
rhetoric, they supply their followers with unconscious 
permission for pathological behavior. At the present, the 
peace in Bosnia is maintained through the threat of military 
force only. If the statesmen of the region continue to 
aggravate the tension between the ethnic groups in Bosnia, 
Scott Peterson, "Dreams of a Unified Bosnia Fade as 
Ethnic Lines Harden," The Christian Science Monitor 2 0 May 
1996, p. 14. 
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the peaceful unification of Bosnia will become increasingly 
less probable. 
In another region wracked by conflict between ethnic 
groups, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has recently 
been threatened by Israel's offensive military operations 
directed against Hizbulla guerrillas in Lebanon. Acting in 
revenge for increased terrorism on the part of Islamic 
extremists, Israel's military campaign has claimed the lives 
of many civilians, to include an air attack on a UN 
installation on 18 April, 1996 which killed seventy 
refugees. 
In Kuwait, Bosnia, and Israel, atrocities and continued 
tension have resulted from permission granted by leaders for 
people to engage in pathological acts of revenge. Whether 
this permission was granted intentionally or by accident, 
the results were, in psychological and sociological terms, 
nearly identical. There is little that leaders can do to 
contain or combat unconscious permission, as that type 
legitimation is a personal and social reaction to certain 
events and contextual stimuli. Efforts can be made, 
John Battersby, "Israelis See One Side of War," The 
Christian Science Monitor 19 April 1996, p. 1. 
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however, to limit the potential for war atrocities through 
eliminating and countering conscious permission through 
rhetoric and direct orders. These efforts place new burdens 
on statesmen, military leaders, and individual soldiers. 
While these new challenges to peacekeeping are 
unprecedented, they have in recent years been met 
successfully. In the Fall of 1994, elements of the U.S. 
Army's 82nd Airborne division took-off in C-141 aircraft 
bound for Haiti. Their mission was to secure the city of 
Port-au-Prince and use force to ensure that the country's 
military regime stepped down and allowed popularly-elected 
president Jean Bertuand Aristide to take office. While the 
forces were en route, a diplomatic delegation led by former 
President Carter succeeded in negotiating a peaceful 
transfer of power. The soldiers of the 82nd Airborne had to 
quickly reorient their mission posture from direct combat to 
peacekeeping. This "mid-stream diaper change" presented a 
number of problems and demanded a high level of maturity 
from individual soldiers, some not much older than 18 years, 
and their entire chain-of-command. In the end, the 82nd 
Airborne's mission was a success and the U.S. forces were 
able to occupy Haiti without major incident. 
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While the success of the 82nd Airborne represents a 
triumph on the part of military leaders and soldiers in 
limiting the potential for pathological behavior and 
tragedy, recent efforts by the leadership of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization in Israel are aimed at limiting the 
dissemination of conscious permission through rhetoric. On 
24 April, 1995, the Palestinian National Council voted 504-
54 to remove language from the charter of the P.L.O. 
demanding the destruction of Israel."^ Such a move clearly 
represents an effort to stop rhetoric that conveys 
permission for normal people to engage in pathological acts 
aimed at destroying the state of Israel. While the P.L.O. 
leadership can do little to control vindictive emotions 
among Palestinians arising from long years of conflict with 
Israel, they are attempting to lesson the potential for 
( 
tragedy by ending official sanctioning of violence directed 
against Israelis. 
While this work is primarily intended as an analysis of 
behavior in wartime, it is difficult to undertake such a 
work without addressing potential solutions to the problems. 
John Battersby, "Palestinians Boost Mideast Peace, End 
Call for Destruction of Israel," The Christian Science 
Monitor 2 6 April 1996, p. 6. 
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Any effort to outline solutions to complex and troubling 
political problems such as revenge is bound to be incomplete 
due to the seemingly endless varieties of challenges posed 
in the international arena. If, as Quincy Wright posited, 
the study of international relations is an attempt to 
analyze the summation of all knowledge,^''" then the chances 
of developing a comprehensive solution are slim indeed. But 
the problem of revenge and permission in warfare needs to be 
addressed if contemporary peacemakers and peacekeepers are 
to hope for success in their endeavors. 
Chapter V presented a bifocal approach to the 
phenomenon of permission and pathology. Any potential 
solution to the problem of revenge must address either 
conscious or unconscious permission, or both. Since 
unconscious permission is a product of an individual's 
reaction to contemporary events, little can be done to 
prevent its effects beyond acknowledging its presence and 
potential. If, however, national decision makers, military 
leaders, and soldiers are aware of the potential for 
disaster raised by their emotional reactions to certain 
Quincy Wright, The Study of International Relations New 
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955. 
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events, perhaps they can take steps to avoid giving 
themselves over to a shame/rage cycle that produces 
unconscious permission. 
Conscious permission is a much easier issue to address. 
Leaders must be aware of the affectiveness of their 
language. If a leader can understand the manner in which 
the use of certain inflammatory language increases the 
likelihood for pathological behavior among subordinates, 
then that leader can strive to avoid such language, as in 
the case of the recent efforts of the P.L.O. 
The problem with this attempt at a solution is that 
many leaders are aware of the affectiveness of their 
rhetoric and welcome the potential for violence among their 
followers. Hitler certainly intended to grant what this 
study calls conscious permission to the German nation 
through his rhetoric. Leaders like Adolf Hitler, Radovan 
Karadzic, and any others who use language to "vow revenge" 
understand completely the manner in which their rhetoric 
influences the behavior of their followers. The destruction 
of Lidice in 1942 and the willingness with which his 
soldiers participated in the massacre could not have been 
much of a surprise to Hitler. He had been hard at work 
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since the 1920's to ensure that his followers would be able 
to engage in such pathological behavior when he ordered them 
to do so. No amount of enlightenment or attention to 
emotions can stop leaders such as this from granting 
conscious permission for revenge to their subjects. 
In conclusion, then, this study aims to illuminate the 
problem of revenge, language, and social pathology in an 
attempt to limit the probability of still further, but 
avoidable wartime tragedies. The ever-increasing reliance 
of peacemakers on military organizations to enforce their 
arrangements demands a heightened awareness among military 
leaders of the manner in which emotions and language can 
affect their own behavior, as well as that of their 
soldiers. The U.S. military can no longer afford to ignore 
the importance of individual and collective emotions. 
Leadership courses and manuals must be updated for leaders 
from the infantry rifle team leader all the way up to the 
Natioal War Colleges to include an examination of the 
important role that emotions play in affecting behavior 
among individual soldiers. Those leaders who continue to 
deliberately use language to grant permission for 
pathological behavior will always pose a threat to 
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international security. Perhaps, however, by identifying 
the potential that these leaders generate for tragedy, other 
national leaders and peacemakers might be able to anticipate 
trouble and thus move to block any further spread of 
hostilities that could result from such sinister 
manipulations of emotions. 
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